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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON U.S. HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND THE
SOURCES OF SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
SEPTEMBER 2016
THOMAS HERNDON
B.A., THE EVERGREEN STATE COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert Pollin
This dissertation consists of three essays which analyze the role of household debt
in the financial crisis of 2007-2009, and weak recovery that followed. In these essays,
I pursue the following research topics: 1) Estimation of the effects of mortgage fraud
on losses to foreclosure, 2) Estimation of whether loan modifications increased or de-
creased debt, and 3) Analyzing the historical evolution of housing finance regulation
to advance a proposal for reform. While formally independent, these essays share
a common theoretical perspective located at the intersection of financial macroeco-
nomics and political economy. These essays analyze how conflicts of interest and
inside information in the structure of private mortgage securitization generated per-
verse incentives that increased financial fragility. These problems caused large losses
to foreclosure for borrowers, investors, and the communities in which the foreclosures
were located in.
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The first essay describes how mortgage fraud by the financial services industry
concentrated risk and leverage on the borrowers least able to bear it. The industry
then deceived investors who bought securities based on these mortgages about the
level of risk they were taking on. This essay finds that excess losses to foreclosure
borne by investors due to fraud were substantial, prolonged through time, and con-
centrated in economically fragile communities that did not recover from the financial
crisis. The second essay discusses how a conflict of interest between loan servicers and
investors impeded efficient debt restructuring in loan modifications. This essay finds
that instead of mitigating losses for investors by forgiving debt, servicers increased
borrowers' debt by imposing punitive fees. However, while these fees were profitable
for servicers, they resulted in larger eventual losses for investors due to redefaults.
The final essay locates the failures identified by the first two essays within the larger
historical evolution of housing financial regulation. This essay proposes the creation
of a new public option for household finance which would provide regulatory tools to
prevent consumer protection abuses.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
LIAR'S LOANS, MORTGAGE FRAUD, AND THE GREAT
RECESSION
1.1 Introduction
Losses in private label residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) were at the
epicenter of the financial crisis. These losses caused the failure of institutions heav-
ily invested in them, as well as the failure of institutions like Bear Stearns or AIG
that were invested in complex derivatives based on them such as collateralized debt
obligations or credit default swaps. Existing economic research has shown that a sub-
stantial portion of the defaults in the loans used to collateralize these securities was
associated with fraudulent or negligent origination practices,1 that fraud was particu-
larly severe in no/low documentation loans known colloquially within the industry as
Liar's Loans, and that the quality of these loans was systematically misrepresented
to the investors that purchased these securities by all major intermediaries involved
in the sales of mortgages (Ben-David, 2011; Black, 2013; Garmaise, 2015; Griffin and
Maturana, 2016; Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014; Keys et al., 2010; Mian and Sufi,
2015; Piskorski, Seru and Witkin, 2015). However, as of writing the no paper has yet
estimated the effect of fraud on losses to foreclosure in the loans used as collateral for
these securities.
This paper seeks to fill this gap by 1) Accounting for total losses to foreclosure
due Liar's Loans, and 2) Estimating what portion of total losses can be considered
1The term fraud is used in this article in the economic sense and should not be seen as having
any legal significance. See page 5 for a full definition.
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excess from the perspective of the investor. Losses for Liar's Loans are considered
excess if they are greater than those that would have occurred if the loan qual-
ity information disclosed to investors had been accurate instead of fraudulent. The
main findings in this paper suggest that losses in foreclosure due to fraud in this
market were substantial, prolonged throughout the entire crisis and Great Recession
from 2007-2012, and concentrated in economically fragile geographic areas. Losses in
Liar's Loans account for roughly 70% of total losses in the data and 30% Liar's Loans
losses of can be considered excess. Projected to the level of the entire market, this
implies that no/low documentation loans can account for approximately $345 billion
of the $500 billion in losses in this market, $100 billion of which can be considered
excess. Moreover, 44% of total losses occurred in ZIP codes with the highest levels
of fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications. These areas were par-
ticularly poorly suited to bear these losses, and the prolonged losses to foreclosure
in these neighborhoods helps to explain the terrible economic performance of these
areas throughout the Great Recession.
The research design pursued in this paper identifies the causal effects of fraud
on losses to foreclosure by comparing losses on loans in the no/low documentation
treatment group, with losses on loans with similar observable risk measures in the full
documentation control group. Systematically larger losses in the treatment group are
consistent with the causal effects of fraud. The main problem with this research design
discussed in the empirical literature is the presence of fraud in the full documentation
control group, which would cause this comparison to understate true excess losses
caused by fraud (Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014; Griffin and Maturana, 2016). To
address this issue, qualitative information on high fraud originators from lawsuits
regarding the actual loans in the dataset2 is used to refine the control group by
2These lawsuits are discussed in section 3.3.
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removing loans originated by these institutions. Additionally, loans from ZIP codes
with high levels of fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications are
removed from the control group. Regression discontinuity models based on those in
the literature are then used to confirm the presence of fraud in the full documentation
control group, as well as show that the refined full documentation control group is
meaningfully freer of fraud.
In addition to the contribution to the empirical research on fraud, the findings in
this paper are broadly relevant for research on macroprudential financial regulation,
and research on the role of household balance sheets in the financial crisis. The esti-
mate of excess losses to foreclosure is significant for financial regulation because these
losses have caused numerous lawsuits from investors who claim they were defrauded
by the major financial institutions that misrepresented the quality of the mortgages
in the offering documents for the securities they purchased. Market regulations and
contractual obligations that require the accurate disclosure of asset quality are a nec-
essary condition for the basic functioning of capital markets. However, this minimum
condition was not met on a widespread basis because all reputable intermediaries in-
volved in the sale of mortgages were engaged in systematic misrepresentation (Griffin
and Maturana, 2016; Piskorski, Seru and Witkin, 2015). The basic issue underlying
these lawsuits is succintly summarized in a recent ruling by District Judge Denise
Cote,
This case is complex from almost any angle, but at its core there is a
single, simple question. Did the defendants accurately describe the home
mortgages in the Offering Documents for the securities they sold that were
backed by those mortgages? Following trial, the answer to that question
is clear. The offering documents did not correctly describe the mortgage
loans. The magnitude of falsity, conservatively measured, is enormous.
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Given the magnitude of falsity, it is perhaps not surprising that in
defending this lawsuit defendants did not opt to prove that the statements
in the Offering Documents were truthful.3 [emphasis added]
From the perspective of the investor, the estimate of excess losses is significant be-
cause it measures how much more Liar's Loans lost in foreclosure than if the offering
documents had accurately described the quality of the mortgages, rather than mis-
represented it. To eliminate the problems in this market, financial regulation will
likely need to prioritize increased monitoring of financial institutions, enforcement of
penalties for violations of disclosure rules including criminal prosecution for finan-
cial institution executives involved in misrepresentation, increase investor recourse
for violations of stated representations, and limit extreme compensation packages for
executives to reduce incentives for looting.
The findings are also relevant for historical narratives of the role of household
balance sheets in the financial crisis because losses to foreclosure imply that household
wealth had already been entirely wiped out. In addition to loss of wealth for the
individual homeowner, losses to foreclosure have substantial negative externalities
that cause needless loss of wealth for everyone in a neighborhood. Research has
shown that the fire sale of homes caused by large numbers of foreclosures during
the financial crisis reduced house prices lower than they otherwise would have fallen,
and can account for roughly one-third of the fall in house prices. The reduction in
house prices further impaired household balance sheets, thereby reducing aggregate
demand. Estimates suggest the causal effects of foreclosures during the crisis were
responsible for roughly one-fifth of the decline in residential investment and auto-sales
3From ruling in Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America, May 11th, 2015.
The FHFA sued 16 trustees for misrepresentations made in offering documents and prospectuses for
securities sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. All but Nomura and Royal Bank Scotland settled
out of court, and the court ruled against these institutions in trial on May 11th, 2015. Accessed on
June 26th, 2015 from: https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2077713/
ruling-on-mortgage-fraud-in-2008-crisis.pdf
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(Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2015). Moreover, many of the investors in these securities
were institutional investors such as retirement and pension funds. Therefore losses in
these securities also contributed to losses of household wealth and retirement savings.
The prolonged losses to foreclosure due to fraud that were concentrated in eco-
nomically fragile areas also help to explain the lack of recovery in these places. The
financial panic had largely subsided by 2009. However losses to foreclosure in private
label RMBS were much more prolonged, and remained at a high level of close to $100
billion per year from 2010-2012. Fully 44% of the losses to foreclosure from 2008-2012,
or roughly $220 billion, occurred in ZIP codes with the highest levels of fraudulent
income overstatement on mortgage applications. These ZIP codes were particularly
poorly suited to bear these losses because in the pre-crisis period they had low average
credit scores, low income, high poverty rates, and high unemployment. Research has
shown that these ZIP codes experienced terrible economic performance throughout
the course of the crisis, including negative income growth, increased poverty, and
increased unemployment (Mian and Sufi, 2015).
1.2 Literature Review
The literature review in this section provides the necessary background context
for understanding how the main results contribute to the existing research on mort-
gage fraud. The existing empirical research has directly observed numerous forms of
fraud, and estimated the effects of fraud on increasing the probability of default. The
basic description of fraud that emerges from this body of research is that executives
of institutions that originated loans to be securitized in the private label market had
perverse incentives based on the volume of loans originated, rather than the quality.
To increase origination volume, these institutions systematically abandoned under-
writing standards or falsified documents outright. These practices were particularly
severe in no/low documentation loans that did not require documentation of income,
5
assets, or employment, and were thus named Liar's Loans. The deceptive practices
were not disclosed to investors who purchased securities based on these loans, as re-
quired by market regulations and contractual obligations. Finally, mortgage fraud
was clustered in economically fragile areas before the crisis and contributed to the
prolonged deterioration during the Great Recession.
The empirical research has focused on directly observing fraud, and estimating
the effects of fraud on delinquency at the loan level. However, we would also expect
fraud to cause increased losses in foreclosure because most forms of fraud resulted
in concealing increases in borrower leverage. The analysis in this paper fills this
gap by 1) Accounting for the amount of losses to foreclosure in this market due to
no/low documentation Liar's Loans, and 2) Estimating what portion of these losses
can be considered excess from the perspective of the investor. Losses are considered
excess if they are greater than those which would have occurred if the loan quality
information disclosed to investors had been accurate, rather than fraudulent.
Fraud is defined as deception or misrepresentation with the intended to result
in financial or personal gain. The term fraud is used in this paper in the broader
economic sense, rather than the narrow legal sense. Fraud is used to refer to the
economics of deception and trickery, rather than trades based on mutually beneficial
gains. The term as used here should not be seen as having any legal significance.
That being said, much of what occurred in this market was in fact illegal. These
fraudulent practices have led to numerous lawsuits and Department of Justice settle-
ments, but few prison sentences. Although their is no direcrt evidence of intent in
the dataset, existing research has shown that the relevant parties in this market had
the information to be adequately aware of misrepresentation, as well as the incentives
to profit from deception (Griffin and Maturana, 2016). Therefore fraud is the most
accurate term to describe the practices in this market.
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The private label, originate to distribute supply chain consisted of institutions
which originated mortgages and sold these loans to trustees. The trustees then pack-
aged the mortgages into securities, obtained ratings from ratings agencies, and sold
the securities to investors. Losses in these securities were at the epicenter of the fi-
nancial crisis of 2007-2008. A substantial body of research has documented a high
incidence of mortgage fraud in the loans used as collateral for these securities. For
example, as early as 2004 the FBI warned of an epidemic of mortgage fraud which
could cause a financial crisis (Black, 2013). Also, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Com-
mision concluded that a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics was an
essential cause of the crisis (FCIC, 2011).
Executives at institutions that originated loans to be securitized in this market
had perverse incentives to increase short-term profits based on the volume of loans
originated, rather than the quality of loans. Executives were able to receive large
bonus compensation for short term gains, for example through stock options that were
not required to be paid back if the firm went bankrupt.4 Fraud was particularly useful
for increasing short-term revenues because toxic loans tended to have high initial fees
attached to them. Similar to problems in the S&L crisis, this allowed originators to
report high fee revenue before losses occurred (Black, 2013). Additionally, originating
institutions could sell riskier loans to be securitized for a higher price than safer loans
(Taub, 2014).
That being said, many of the originators still held a large portion of the toxic
loans in their portfolio, and went bankrupt as a result. The pattern of extreme exec-
utive compensation, despite the failure of their firms, could reasonably be described
as looting. Looting occurs when owners or executives have limited liability for a
4Perverse incentives due to extreme bonus compensation were not limited to this market. They
were a consistent feature of the expansion of the financial system following deregulation (Crotty,
2009).
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firm, and maximize short-term pay-outs at the expense of the long run health of their
firm resulting in bankruptcy. Looting has been described as bankruptcy for profit.
(Akerlof and Romer, 1993). This pattern of looting is significant for macroprudential
regulation because skin in the game rules that require institutions to hold a portion
of the mortgages they originated in their portfolio would not have prevented fraud.
These institutions had substantial skin in the game which caused their failure. How-
ever, their executives did not. Fraud prevention would likely have required increased
monitoring of institutions, limits to extreme compensation packages, and criminal
prosecution of top executives (Black, 2013).
These perverse incentives led originators to increase loan volume through the
systematic abandonment of underwriting standards, or the outright falsification of
documents. The common effect of these fraudulent practices was for loan officers to
conceal increases in leverage or risk in order to qualify borrowers for larger loans than
they would have been able to otherwise obtain. A recent set of empirical papers has
directly measured a high incidence of a wide variety of types of mortgage fraud. These
forms of fraud include income overstatement, asset overstatement, unreported second
liens, misreported owner occupancy status, and appraisal inflation (Ben-David, 2011;
Garmaise, 2015; Griffin and Maturana, 2016; Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014; Keys
et al., 2010; Piskorski, Seru and Witkin, 2015). For example, using conservative
measures Griffin and Maturana (2016) find that 48% of loans contain at least one
of three relatively easy to quantify forms of fraud: appraisal inflation, unreported
second liens, and misreported owner occupancy status. They find that loans with one
of these forms of fraud were 51% more likely to become delinquent.
The focus on no/low documentation loans in this study is meaningful because
these loans were so notoriously fraudulent that they were colloquially known within
the industry as Liar's Loans. To be sure, at the time, originating no/low docu-
mentation mortgages was not prohibited as long as the stated income or assets were
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accurate. However, as the colloquial name indicates, these loans were not used to
accurately state borrower financial characteristics. Indeed, loan officers often coached
borrowers to falsely state their information, or falsified borrower documents without
the borrower's knowledge.5 As a result, these loans performed particularly poorly.
For example, Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil (2014) estimated the effects of income over-
statement on delinquency rates in Liar's Loans, and showed that the delinquency rate
for these loans is 5-8 percentage points higher than the full documentation control
group.6 Most forms of Liar's Loans have now been prohibited.
This body of research has also shown that these forms of fraud were systemat-
ically concealed from investors who purchased securities based on these loans. For
example, Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015) found that a significant degree of mis-
representation exists across all reputable intermediaries involved in the sale of mort-
gages, [emphasis in original]. The sale of loans that were originated with fraudulent
practices, or simply negligent underwriting, typically violated market regulations and
contractual obligations. These rules require the accurate disclosure of loan quality;
however, these practices obviously were not disclosed.7 All major trustees have had
5For example, Omar Khan, a loan officer at Ameriquest/Argent, stated, Every closing was a
bait and switch, because you could never get them to the table if you were honest. He further
elaborated, There were instances where the borrower felt uncomfortable about signing the stated
income letter, because they didn't want to lie, and the stated income letter would be filled out
later on by the processing staff [National Credit Union Administration Board v. Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association, 2014]. This anecdote is supported by an FBI study, which found that 80% of
fraud cases involved collusion or collaboration with industry insiders based on investigations and
fraud reports (FBI, 2007).
6However, the authors emphasize that this should be seen as a conservative lower bound, because
the identifying assumption is that the full documentation control group is free of fraud.
7The typical offering documents included prospectus supplements which described the quality of
collateral underyling the securities. These documents tended to include boilerplate language similar
to, Wells Fargo Bank's underwriting standards are applied by or on behalf of the Wells Fargo Bank
to evaluate the applicant's credit standing and the ability to repay the loan, as well as the value
and adequacy of the mortgaged properties collateral [General Retirement System of the City of
Detroit v. Wells Fargo et al, 2009]. If the trustee discovered a breach of these representations and
warranties, such as falsification of borrower financial characteristics, violations of assurances that
loans were originated following proper underwriting standards, or that the appraisal value for the
collateral was inflated, the trustee must notify the appropriate parties and take steps to enforce
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numerous lawsuits initiated against them.8 Forensic auditing has found that in some
cases as high as 99% of the loans in an issuance were in violation of underwriting
practices stated in offering documents. One court described the problem thus: to
accept that the Trustee was unaware of...reports and investigations [regarding un-
derwriter and servicer misconduct] would require the court to 'find that responsible
officers of Defendants had been living under a rock ' and that [i]f the Trustee was
indeed 'living under a rock,' it had no right to do so given it's role and responsibilities
(Galdston, Kaplan and Gilmore, 2014). The estimate of excess losses is significant
from the perspective of the investors. The estimate shows on average how much more
the fraudulent loans used as collateral for these securities lost in foreclosure than if
the information disclosed about them was accurate rather than misrepresented.
In contrast to the problems with originating institutions that could reasonably be
described as looting, the problems in the market for securities based on these loans
are more accurately described as a market for lemons. The term lemon refers to
a car which is poor quality, or more generally to any product that is poor quality.
A market for lemons is a market where good and bad quality products are sold, but
where the buyers cannot know beforehand whether they are buying a good or bad
product. In these markets bad products tend to push out good products because
good and bad products must sell at the same price. Over the course of the housing
the responsible parties obligation to cure, substitute, or repurchase the defective mortgage loans
[National Credit Union Administration Board v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, 2014]. It
should be noted that origination practices that could be argued were simply negligent or dubious, but
did not involve outright falsfication, were still fraudulent because they violated the representations
made in offering documents.
8An older list of 58 lawsuits filed between 2008-2012 can be found in the appendix to ?. How-
ever, this list is not exhaustive, as the 2009 class action lawsuit used in this paper was not on
the list (General Retirement System of the City of Detroit v. Wells Fargo et al, 2009). In ad-
dition, several similar lawsuits have been filed for violations of the False Claims Act or the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), for actions such as mis-
representing the quality of loans to entities which insured these loans. A list of 31 lawsuits
can be found at: http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/1082/doc/Recent-FIRREA-Cases_
BuckleySandler-LLP_v20.pdf. Accessed August 12th, 2015.
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bubble, it is clear that bad practices in this market had pushed good practices out
because these problems were common to all major institutions involved in the sale of
these securities (Akerlof, 1970).
As of writing, the empirical papers on mortgage fraud have primarily focused on
directly observing the incidence of fraud, and constructing loan level estimates of the
effects of fraud on delinquency. However, we would also expect the concealed leverage
and risk to cause these loans to lose more in foreclosure than non-fraudulent loans.
Ben-David (2011) provides a simple illustration of how fraud concealed increases in
borrower leverage using the example of appraisal inflation in the 2006 sale of a condo
in Chicago. The condo was worth $235,000, but the builder was willing to inflate the
price to $255,000 and return the extra cash to the buyer at the closing table. The
buyer could then use the extra $20,000 as a down payment for a mortgage with a
loan-to-value ratio of just under 95%. However, the true loan-to-value ratio was 100%
because none of the borrower's own money was actually used for the down payment.9
Due to this hidden increase in leverage, the loan would also be expected to lose more
in foreclosure. This paper builds on the existing literature by estimating total excess
losses for the entire market.
The estimates in this paper are also relevant for research that has shown that
the geographic areas with high levels of fraud performed poorly during the Great
Recession. These estimates of losses to foreclosure provide a quantitative description
of one of the mechanisms that caused this poor performance. For example, Mian
and Sufi (2015) construct a measure of fraudulent income overstatement on mort-
gage applications at the ZIP code level.10 They find that high income overstatement
9Alternatively, in some cases the buyer walked away with the money, used it to finance remod-
elings, or even to buy a new Mini-Cooper sports car in one instance. Also, loan originators often
pocketed the extra money through high origination fees.
10They construct this measure as the difference in the annualized growth of income reported to
the IRS, and reported on mortgage applications under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
They find that the housing bubble period from 2002-2005 was unique in that the growth of income
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ZIP codes performed significantly worse with higher default rates, negative income
growth, increased poverty, and increased unemployment. Additionally, Griffin and
Maturana (2014) find that areas with higher concentrations of originators who mis-
reported mortgage information experienced a 75% larger relative increase in house
prices from 2003 to 2006, and a 90% larger relative decrease from 2007-2012. The
estimates of total and excess losses to foreclosure produced in this paper are signifi-
cant for understanding the poor performance of these areas. Research has shown that
foreclosures have large negative externalities which cause unnecesary destruction of
wealth for everyone in a neighborhood. The large number of foreclosures that oc-
curred during the financial crisis and Great Recession caused homes to be sold in a
fire sale that depressed values for all houses in the neighborhood. The neighborhood
wide reduction in house prices impaired all household balance sheets in an area, re-
ducing aggregate demand. Research has shown that the causal effects of foreclosures
during the financial crisis and Great Recession were responsible for roughly one-third
of the decline in house prices, one-fifth of the decline in residential investment, and
one-fifth of the decline in auto-sales (Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2015).
1.3 Research Design
The research design section is organized into three parts. The first part presents
the data description, the second presents the identification strategy and regression
model, and the third discusses data-driven refinements for the control group. Refine-
ments are necessary for the full documentation control group because the empirical
literature has shown that full documentation loans in the private label RMBS mar-
ket also had a high incidence of fraud. This contamination would cause comparisons
on mortgage applications reported in HMDA data substantially outpaced that reported on IRS
documents, while in past periods the ratio of growth in income was constant. They find that this
was driven by fraudulent income overstatement in the private label RMBS market.
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based on the unrefined control group to understate the true effects of fraud on ex-
cess losses. Refinements to reduce the incidence of fraud in the full documentation
control group are made using qualitative data from lawsuit documents, measures of
high fraud ZIP codes, and and regression discontinuity models from the empirical
literature.
1.3.1 Data Description
The sample of loans used in this study comes from the Columbia Collateral File
(CCF). The CCF is a large loan-level panel dataset that includes all loans used
as collateral in private label RMBS for which Wells Fargo is a trustee. The data
contains monthly observations for 139 variables that include measures such as loan
characteristics and performance. The data begins in December 2006, which makes
2007 the first year for which complete data is available. In December 2007, the CCF
contained roughly 4.2 million total loans; 2.4 million of these loans, or 58%, were
Liar's Loans. By 2012 the number of loans in the dataset had fallen to roughly 1.8
million. This is largely due to the 1.5 million completed foreclosures that occurred.
Figure 1.1 shows the yearly outstanding balance of the the entire private label
market, the CCF, and Liar's Loans in the CCF from 2002-2012. The private label
market grew rapidly from 2002 to 2007, almost tripling in value. After peaking at
an outstanding balance of $2.7 trillion in 2007, the market experienced severe losses
and decline rapidly. The CCF was not a substantial portion of the market until 2005.
However, it grew rapidly to account for just under 40% of market share in 2007 at an
outstanding balance of $1.05 trillion.
Descriptions of fraud suggest that the intensity of fraud increased through time
peaking roughly from 2005-2007. Liar's Loans have been reported to be particularly
bad in this time period. The growth of the share of Liar's Loans in the CCF mirrors
this pattern. In 2003 the share was 40% of loans in the CCF. The share grew rapidly
13
Figure 1.1. Outstanding Balance of Private Label RMBS Market
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to peak at two-thirds in 2007. The share has remained high at about 60% from
2007-2012 (SIFMA, 2015).
The CCF data from 2007-2012 appears to be broadly representative of the entire
market. In general, the data accounts for a substantial portion of the entire market
and mirrors the growth of the market. Also, the summary statistics of observable risk
measures are similar to those in Griffin and Maturana (2016) and Piskorski, Seru and
Witkin (2015). The dataset also contains loans originated by roughly 2000 different
institutions.11 However, there is also some reason to believe that the loans in the CCF
performed better than average for the market. Wells Fargo was not found to be one
11There were approximately 7000-8000 entries for originator names in the CCF. However, redun-
dancies in originator names occur across numerous dimensions such as capitalization, slight variation
in name, spacing, etc. Therefore the actual size of the list is likely closer to 2000 originators.
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of the ten originators with the highest incidence of fraud by Griffin and Maturana
(2016). This is corroborated by anecdotal reporting that the subprime origination
practices at Wells Fargo were not as bad as for other institutions in the market.
This led Wells Fargo to emerge from the crisis in a much better position than many
other financial institutions.12 Additionally, Wells Fargo has been the subject of fewer
lawsuits than many other institutions.13 Therefore, to the extent that fraudulent
practices were less prevalent in the loans for which Wells Fargo was a trustee, the
estimate of total and excess losses in this paper may understate losses to fraud in the
entire market.
The main risk measures in this dataset are the FICO credit score and the loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio. The LTV ratio is the ratio of the original loan balance to the
appraisal value of the home and is a measure of the amount of leverage for a given
mortgage. The LTV ratio measures the amount of equity in a home which serves
as a cushion to absorb house price declines. The FICO credit score is an index of
creditworthiness that measures the borrower's chance of default over the next two
years. A higher credit score indicates a less risky borrower. The score is based on the
amount of debt a borrower currently owes, the borrower's payment history, types of
credit in use, the length of credit history, and new credit.
The sample of loans from this dataset is restricted to all mortgages that are
1st lien, owner occupied, originated between 2002-2008, with loan-to-value ratios
between 70 and 100, FICO credit scores between 300 and 850, balances greater than
$30,000, and for which there are complete data. The pooled sample is built by
merging the December data to provide a retrospective snap shot of the year. After
these restrictions, the final 2007-2012 pooled sample includes slightly over 7 million
12For example, see http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/
21586295-big-winner-financial-crisis-riding-high
13For example, Wells Fargo appears far fewer times than other institutions on the two lists of
lawsuits in footnote 8.
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loan-year observations. The sample also includes roughly 700,000 of the 1.5 million
unique foreclosures. A large portion of foreclosures are typically dropped the month
after the foreclosure sale is recorded, so dropped foreclosures are merged back into
the December observations.
To my knowledge this study is the first to use this dataset in the context of mea-
suring the effects of fraud on losses to foreclosure. However, the sample is compiled
from trustee reports so it is most similar to the data used in Griffin and Maturana
(2016) and Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015). The main advantage of this data rela-
tive to others used in the literature is that this data contains detailed information on
losses to foreclosure. It is not clear if information on losses to foreclosure is availale
in the other data sources used in the empirical literature. However, no other paper
has measured losses in foreclosure due to fraud.
The ideal dataset for comprehensively estimating the total effects of fraud would
be a loan-level panel set which included measures that recorded whether a loan was
fraudulent or not, what type of fraud, and how intense the fraud was (i.e., whether
income was overstated 5% or 50%). The obvious main disadvantage of data from the
CCF is that it does not directly measure fraud in this manner. Others have been able
to directly measure certain easy to quantify types of fraud by matching loan-level
records with data from other sources such as credit bureau records. However, these
data come from large proprietary datasets which as of writing I do not have access
to.
To address the limitation of not being able to directly observe all forms of fraud,
I restrict the analysis to only estimating the effects of fraud on losses to foreclosure
in no/low documentation loans. These loans were known colloquially within the in-
dustry as Liar's Loans because they were notoriously fraudulent. These loans were
overwhelmingly used to overstate borrower income or assets. Therefore the estimates
produced in this paper do not represent exhaustive estimates of losses due to all forms
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of fraud, but are limited to only measuring losses based on lack of documentation.
Additionally, addressing this limitation also requires refinements to the full documen-
tation control group to reduce the incidence of fraud. These refinements are detailed
in the section 1.3.3.
1.3.2 Identification Strategy and Regression Model
Fraudulent loans are expected to cause increased losses to foreclosure because most
forms of fraud result in concealing borrower leverage and risk. This analysis identifies
the causal effects of fraud on excess losses to foreclosure by comparing losses for loans
in the no/low documentation treatment group with losses for loans with similar risk
measures in a refined full documentation control group. Excess losses in the treatment
group which cannot be explained by observable risk measures are consistent with the
causal effects of fraud.
The mean differences in losses to foreclosure between treatment and control groups
can be decomposed into two portions.
E[L|Di = 1] − E[L|Di = 0] = {P (FC|Di = 1) − P (FC|Di = 0)}E[L|FC,Di =
1] + {E[L|FC,Di = 1]− E[L|FC,Di = 0]P (FC|Di = 0),
where L =loss in foreclosure, FC = foreclosure, and Di is an indicator variable
coded 1 for the treatment group. The first of these terms is the increase in losses due
to the extra foreclosures caused by fraud. The second term is the increase in losses
for Liar's Loans conditional on foreclosure (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).14
I use a simple linear regression models to estimate these effects in two steps. The
regression model is:
yizt = αz + γt + β0 + β1 ∗Di + Λ ∗Xi + i ,
14In addition to conditioning on foreclosure and treatment status, these means also need to be
conditioned on appropriate controls. These subscripts have been omitted to facilitate ease of pre-
sentation.
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where yi is one of four outcome variables, Di is the binary treatment variable, Xi
is a vector of controls, αz is a set of ZIP code level fixed effects, and γt are loan-year
observation fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the ZIP code level for all
models. This model is run for the pooled sample of loans; however, the results are
robust to running the model for each year seperately.
The first set of regressions measures estimates the increase in the foreclosure rate
using an indicator variable coded 1 for loans that were foreclosed on during a year.
The second set of regressions measures the increase in losses in dollars using data
from the variable loss on liquidated property. This variable likely includes all home
forfeiture actions more broadly, such as short sales or deeds in lieu. These actions are
all substantially similar to foreclosure because they require loss of the home. I also
estimate extra delinquencies using an indicator variable coded 1 for loans that were
delinquent at least once during the year. Finally, I estimate losses as a share of the
original balance. This helps normalize losses to foreclosure to help ensure that the
dollar value estimates are accurate. Foreclosure and delinquency rates are estimated
in the full pooled sample, while losses are estimated conditional on foreclosure.
The set of controls includes risk measures, loan type, loan purpose, origination
years, and original balance. The principal risk measures employed are the loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio and FICO score. A set of indicators for low, medium, and high
LTVs are used for the regressions. Low LTVs are those with LTVs of 80 and under,
which is the traditional cut off for the classic mortgage. High LTVs are those with
LTVs of 95 or higher because this is a common cut-off for inclusion into RMBS pools.
LTVs between 80 to 95 are considered medium leverage mortgages.
Indicators are also included for FICO credit scores. The OCC Mortgage Metrics
report defines subprime loans as those with FICO scores less than 620, alt-A loans as
those with FICO scores between 620 and 660, and prime loans as those with FICO
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scores above 660. In addition an indicator is also included for FICOs greater than
760, which is the cut off for the FICO High Achievers list.15
Indicator variables for loan type and purpose are also included in the regressions
as well. The dataset has two broad types of mortgages: fixed rate and adjustable.
Fixed rate mortgages are typically considered the least risky, while adjustable rate are
considered higher risk. Finally, indicator variables for origination year and observation
year are also included.
Formally, identification depends on E[i|Di, Xi, αz, γt] = 0. This condition should
be largely satisfied because the highly detailed micro data allows for fine-grained
controls for risk measures, geographic shocks, or different shocks by year. Comparing
loans with similar risk measures, in the same ZIP codes, and within the same years
should eliminate selection bias on observables. In addition, I conduct the Oster
(2014) robustness test in section 5 to assess the stability of estimated coefficients due
to selection on unobservables.
There are also two known problems with this identification strategy. These prob-
lems would both cause the estimates to understate the true causal effects of fraud on
losses to foreclosure. The first problem is that estimating excess losses conditional
on foreclosure introduces the conditional-on-positive selection bias. The estimate of
excess losses conditional on foreclosure can be decomposed into a causal effect and a
selection bias. Selection bias arises due to fraud changing the composition of those
who are foreclosed on (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In this case, the bias likely under-
states the true effects of fraud because fraud lowers the threshold for those that are
foreclosed on in the treatment group. At the margin, the set of foreclosed loans in the
Liar's Loans group should therefore be larger and contain more borrowers who were
15This definition comes from myfico.com. Accessed 6-25-2015
from: http://ficoforums.myfico.com/t5/Understanding-FICO-Scoring/
Expanded-quot-FICO-High-Achievers-quot-scores-of-760-and-above/td-p/111525.
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less risky than the full documentation group. This selection bias would understate
average losses. Thought of slightly differently, the set of borrower's who were selected
into foreclosure in the full documentation group were more risky on average ex-ante
because they ended up in foreclosure despite having better loans. The inclusion of
appropriate controls for risk to some extent should mitigate some of this selection
bias, but it is unlikely to completely eliminate it. That being said, the estimation
of the effects of fraud on delinquency and foreclosure rates are unaffected by this
bias and still have a causal interpretation. To the extent that risk controls do not
mitigate this selection bias, the estimates of losses conditional on foreclosure in this
paper would understate the true causal effects of fraud.
The second problem with this identification strategy is the presence of fraud in the
full documentation loan control group. This problem has been well documented in
the existing research and would cause the estimate of excess losses to understate the
true effects of fraud (Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2014). For example, the widespread
incidence of fraud in full documentation loans in this market was confirmed by Griffin
and Maturana (2016). They found that roughly half of full documentation loans con-
tained at least one of three easy to measure types of fraud: appraisal overstatement,
misreported owner occupancy status, or unreported second liens. Therefore, refine-
ments to the control group to remove full documentation loans with a high probability
of fraud are necessary and will be described in the next section. Surprisingly, Griffin
and Maturana (2016) also found a similar incidence of fraud between full documen-
tation and Liar's Loans for these measures. However, Griffin and Maturana (2016)
were not able to estimate differences in income or asset overstatement which is likely
the main dimension of fraud on which no/low and full documentation loans differ.
Therefore, the comparison of these loans should still provide an estimate of mean-
ingful differences in fraud provided that refinements are made to the control group.
To the extent that the refinements do not completely purge fraud from the control
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group, we would also expect the estimates in this paper to underestimate the true
causal effects of fraud. For these reasons, the estimates produced in this paper are
best interpreted as a conservative lower bound for the true causal effects.
1.3.3 Refinements to the Control Group
I make two refinements to the control group to remove loans with a higher proba-
bility of containing fraud. First, I use qualitative information from lawsuit documents
concerning the actual loans in the dataset to remove loans originated by institutions
notorious for employing fraudulent practices. Second, I remove loans from ZIP codes
with high levels of fradulent income overstatement on mortgage applications. I then
use regression discontinuity models based on those in the empirical literature to con-
firm the presence of fraud in the control group, and show that the refined control
group is meaningfully freer of fraud than the unrefined control group.
The sample of loans used in this article is from the Columbia Collateral File (CCF)
which includes all publicly available collateral files for RMBS for which Wells Fargo
serves as a trustee. Wells Fargo has been sued at least twice for misrepresenting the
qualities of these loans in offering documents. In 2011, Wells Fargo settled a class
action law suit for approximately $125 million with several retirement funds that
sustained large losses on RMBS purchased from Wells Fargo [General Retirement
System of the City of Detroit v. Wells Fargo et al, 2009]. As of time of writing, Wells
Fargo is also being sued by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) for
severe losses on $2.4 billion in RMBS purchased by five credit unions, which caused
the liquidation of the five institutions [National Credit Union Administration Board
v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, 2014].
These lawsuits provide important qualitative information concerning the high inci-
dence of fraudulent practices at particular loan originators, with a total of twenty-five
institutions discussed in depth in both lawsuits. High fraud originators are one of 25
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institutions whose fraudulent practices were described in depth in either lawsuit doc-
ument, while low fraud originators are institutions who are not mentioned in either
lawsuit document.16 Even though the high fraud originators are only 25 institutions
out of a possible list of approximately 2000 institutions, these originators were also
some of the larger institutions and originated approximately half of the loans in the
sample with data recorded for originator name, depending on year. While the study
makes use of lawsuit documents which target Wells Fargo, this study should not be in-
terpreted as singling out Wells Fargo for uniquely poor practices. Deceptive practices
were common to all institutions in this market, and all trustees have had numerous
lawsuits initiated against them. Moreover, as discussed above there is reason to be-
lieve that the practices at Wells Fargo may have been less fraudulent than average
for this market.
Two regression discontinuity models based on loans clustering at LTV intervals of
5 are used to confirm fears of the presence of fraud in the unrefined full documentation
control group, and that the refinements provide a control group more free of fraud.
Griffin and Maturana (2016) find that a large portion of loans in this market were
discontinuously clustered at LTV intervals of 5 units (75, 80, 85, etc.) which can be
seen in Figure 1.2 below. They find that appraisal overstatement was consistently
higher for clustered loans, and that these loans consistently defaulted at a much higher
rate. They conclude that this pattern is more consistent with appraiser's targeting
home valuations given by loan officers than with a random pattern of mistakes.
16The originators named in the NCUA lawsuit are: Ameriquest/Argent, Bank of America, Coun-
trywide, Decision One, DLJ, First Franklin, Fremont, GreenPoint, Impac, Morgan Stanley Mortgage
Capital, National City, New Century, Option One, Paul Financial, RBS/Greenwich Capital, WMC
Mortgage Corp; and the originators named as defendants or named in testimony in the retirement
fund lawsuit are: American Home Mortgage (named in testimony), Bank of America, Bear Stearns,
Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, RBS/Greenwich Capital,
UBS, and Wells Fargo.
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Figure 1.2. Historgram of LTV Heaping at Intervals of 5
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The first model measures excess losses at the LTV intervals. The regression dis-
continuity model measures the increase in negative outcomes for loans clustered at the
LTV intervals of 5, which have been shown to have a higher incidence of fraud. The
regression discontinuity model includes an indicator for clustered loans, and controls
for a fourth degree polynomial of LTV. The model is:
Yi = αz + γt + β0 + β1Z0 + β2ltv + β3ltv
2 + β4ltv
3 + β5ltv
4 + ΓXi + i,
where Z0 is an indicator variable for loans with clustered ltv values, and the
rest of the controls are the same as those used in the main regressions. The excess
losses measured by the estimated coefficient for Z0 are distinct from the excess losses
presented as the main result. The coefficient for Z0 measures excess losses for loans at
the LTV interval compared to loans within the same documentation type not at the
LTV interval, rather than compared to a fraud-free control group. Therefore, this is a
useful tool to measure the incidence of fraud within a single documentation type, but
not across types. Results for this test can be seen in Table 1 and Figure 1.3 below.
The second model based on this discontinuity is to use the McCrary (2008) heap-
ing test for manipulation of the running variable. This test measures the threat to
identification in regression discontinuity designs of agents strategically manipulating
treatment status. The test first divides the data into a rough histogram based on
the running variable, and then smooths the histogram on either side of the break-
point being tested. Manipulation of treatment status would produce heaping at the
breakpoint, which is measured as the log difference in the height of the smoothed
polynomials fitted on either side of the breakpoint. This test is relevant to the cur-
rent analysis because it is likely that a substantial portion of the heaping seen at LTV
intervals of 5 comes from loan officers telling appraisers to target a specific valuation
price that would produce the desired LTV ratio. The heaping test only allows a single
breakpoint to be tested, so the data are recentered around the LTV intervals. The
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default bin size of 1 and bandwidth are used. Results for this test are presented in
Table 1.1 and Figure 1.4 below.
Table 1.1. Results for Excess Losses and Heaping from Regression Discontinuity
Models Based on LTV Clusters
Excess Negative Outcomes Excess Heaping
Loss/Orig Balance Loss ($) Log Difference N
Full Doc
Unrefined 0.00739∗∗∗ 2734.3∗∗∗ 3.24 296657
(4.44) (6.92) (.003)
High Fraud 0.0127∗∗ 3971.9∗∗∗ 3.65 66327
(3.35) (3.91) (.008)
Semi-Refined -0.00241 1939.3 3.18 57769
(-0.61) (1.88) (.007)
Refined -0.00557 1634.8 3.40 15379
(-0.60) (0.75) (.014)
No Doc
Unrefined 0.0139∗∗∗ 5400.7∗∗∗ 3.43 374910
(9.29) (11.08) (.003)
High Fraud 0.0152∗∗∗ 6289.2∗∗∗ 3.64 90430
(5.16) (5.58) (.007)
Semi-Refined 0.0101∗∗∗ 4958.9∗∗∗ 3.41 108424
(3.21) (5.74) (.005)
Refined 0.0208∗∗∗ 5764.6∗∗ 3.39 22140
(3.59) (2.59) (.011)
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This table presents results from regression discontinuity models based on loan clustering at LTV intervals of 5, by
documentation type and level of refinement. Columns 1 and 2 present results for excess losses, with t-statistics in
parentheses. Column 3 presents results from the McCrary heaping test (log-difference) with standard errors in parentheses.
Column 4 presents the total number of loans (N) by level of refinement. The unrefined group uses all loans within a
documentation type. The high fraud group uses all loans from high fraud originators within a documentation type. The
semi-refined group removes all loans from high fraud originators. The fully refined group also removes all loans from
high fraudulent income overstatement zip codes.
Table 1.1 presents results from the two tests. Columns 1 and 2 show results for
excess losses, while column 3 presents results from the McCrary test. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses for excess losses while standard errors are reported in paren-
theses for the heaping test. The table compares regression discontinuity results for
the unrefined full documentation control group, full documentation loans from high
fraud originators, the semi-refined full documentation control group which removes
full documentation loans from high fraud originators, and the fully refined full doc-
umentation control group which removes loans from high fraud originators as well
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as those originated in ZIP codes above the median level of fraudulent inome over-
statement. These groups are also compared for no/low documentation loans. The
basic findings in this table are 1) the unrefined sample of full documentation loans
shows measures consistent with fraud, while 2) both semi- and fully-refined full doc-
umentation control groups exhibit fewer measures associated with fraud than the full
documentation control group. Additionally, measures consistent with fraud are found
for both semi- and fully-refined no/low documentation groups, so it is unlikely that
the null finding for semi- and fully-refined full documentation loans is spurious.
The test for excess losses showed that unrefined full documentation and high fraud
full documentation loans clustered at LTV intervals of five exhibited excess losses, rel-
ative to loans in these groups not clustered at LTV intervals. Excess losses for these
groups ranged from roughly $3,000-$4,000 dollars. Unrefined and high fraud no doc-
umentation loans also showed excess losses which were larger than those estimated
for full documentation loans in these categories by roughly $2500. In contrast to
unrefined and high fraud full documentation loans, semi-refined and fully refined full
documentation groups did not exhibit statistically significant excess losses. However,
semi-refined and fully-refined no documentation groups did exhibit excess losses sim-
ilar to unrefined and high fraud groups. This suggests that the null finding for semi-
and fully-refined full documentation groups is not spurious.
The results for the excess losses for loans clustered at LTV intervals can also
be seen in Figure 1.3. Figure 1.3 displays excess losses for the unrefined control
group, high fraud full documentation loans, and the fully refined control group. The
graph shows that excess losses for the unrefined control group and high fraud full
documentation loans consistently reach local maximums at the LTV intervals of five,
shown with reference lines. For these two groups, the local spikes all consistently
coincide with the LTV intervals. However, this pattern does not occur for the refined
control group. The spikes in excess losses for the refined control group almost all
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Figure 1.3. Excess Losses at LTV Intervals of Five for Full Doc Loans
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occur away from the LTV intervals of 5, with approximately equal amounts occuring
above as below the LTV intervals. This suggests that the pattern of losses for the
refined control group is more random, while the pattern for the other two groups is
not.
The McCrary tests in Table 1.1 showed significant heaping for all groups. However,
high fraud loans showed consistently more heaping than any other group. When
considered with the positive excess losses, this suggests that the full documentation
loans from high fraud originators are appropriate for removing from the control group.
The semi- and fully-refined groups also still exhibited excess heaping. While this
heaping was not associated with statistically significant excess losses, this raises some
concern that fraud has not been completely purged from the control group. To the
extent that some fraud remains in the fully-refined control group, the estimates in
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Figure 1.4. Net Heaping for High Fraud and Refined Full Doc Loans
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this paper would understate the true effects of fraud. Figure 1.4 shows heaping for
high fraud and fully refined groups. The data is centered around the LTV intervals to
facilitate visual comparison. As can be seen, both groups exhibit a subtantial amount
of heaping. That being said, the refined group exhibits less heaping than the high
fraud group.
The final table in this section shows the distribution of covariates between the
Liar's Loans treatment and fully-refined full documentation control groups to assess
any possible observable selection bias. Table 1.2 is divided into three panels. Panel
A shows mean loan information including the original loan balance, LTV and FICO
score. Panel B presents the distribution of risk measures, loan type, and loan pur-
pose between groups. Finally Panel C presents loan performance information. The
basic finding in this table is that the control group consistently has worse observable
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risk measures than the treatment group. To the extent that this selection is not en-
tirely mitigated by the risk controls, we would expect the estimates in this paper to
underestimate the true effects of fraud.
In panel A, we see that the control group has a slightly lower original balance than
the treatment group. This is consistent with the slightly riskier average measures for
the control group. The control group mean FICO score was roughly 30 points lower
than that for the treatment group, while the LTV was 3 percentage points higher.
Panel A also shows the number of loans in the treatment and control group. The
refinements removed a substantial portion of loans from the control group. Removing
loans from high fraud originators caused the largest drop in loans because only roughly
half of the data contained originator names.17 Removing loans from ZIP codes above
the median fraudulent income overstatement also removed a large portion of loans.
Only roughly one-third of the loans in the CCF were originated in ZIP codes below
the median level of income overstatement. However, there are still over 200,000 loans
left so lack of statistical power should not be a problem.
Panel B shows the distribution of LTV ratios, FICO scores, loan purpose, and loan
type between these groups. The control group had a significantly larger proportion of
subprime FICO scores than the treatment group, which had roughly 67% of loans with
credit scores prime or higher. The treatment group also had 80% of loans with LTV
ratios 80 or under. This is a high proportion of loans that should have had a large
equity cushion to absorb house price declines of up to 20%. The treatment group
also had less risky loan types and purposes. Cash-out refinances were notoriously
abused during the housing bubble, and the treatment group includes fewer cash-out
refinances. The treatment group does include more adjustable rate mortgages, which
17While only half of the data contains originator names, all observations contain data for the
current servicer of the loan. As will be more fully discussed in the robustness section, the estimates
in this paper are robust to including high fraud servicers in the high fraud originator measure to
preserve some of the data.
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Table 1.2. Sample Description
Panel A: Loan Information (mean)
Treatment Control
Original Balance ($) 324,749 274,638
Loan-to-Value 80.9 83.5
FICO Score 684.7 652.4
N 3,695,068 204,529
Panel B: Distribution of Risk Measures, Loan Type, and Purpose (%)
Treatment Control
FICO Score
Sub Prime 12.5 36.4
Alt-A 20.4 20.7
Prime 55.2 31.5
High Achiever 11.9 11.4
Loan-to-Value
LTV <= 80 80.3 61.5
80 < LTV <= 95 13.5 24.1
95 <= LTV 6.3 14.5
Loan Type
Fixed Rate 32.7 49.2
Adjustable Rate 67.3 50.8
Loan Purpose
Purchase 53.0 40.5
Refinace 13.9 16.1
Cash-out Refinance 33.1 43.4
Panel C: Loan Performance
Treatment Control
Delinquency Rate (%) 46.8 38.0
Foreclosure Rate (%) 10.2 7.5
Mean Loss in Foreclosure ($)) 176,315 97,675
Loss/Original Balance (%) 57.8 50.3
LTV if Foreclosed (mean) 81.6 84.8
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were riskier than fixed rate mortgages. However, on net, the treatment group has
substantially better observable risk measures. Due to the better risk measures in the
treatment group, if selection bias persists despite the inclusion of controls, we would
expect this bias to understate the true effects of fraud.
The final panel shows loan performance statistics. The poor performance of these
loans is without precedent in recent history. For example, the delinquency rate be-
tween 1995-2005 averaged roughly 2%, and peaked at 11% during the crisis. Despite
having better observable risk measures, the treatment group had a delinquency rate
almost 9 percentage points higher than the already high delinquency rate of the con-
trol group. This difference alone is almost the entire peak rate for all mortgages
during the crisis. Additionally, the foreclosure rate was roughly 25% higher for the
treatment group. These loans also lost a large amount in foreclosure at close to 60%
of the original balance or $176,000. Combined with the roughly 80% mean LTV of
foreclosed Liar's Loans, the average loss of close to 60% of the original balance implies
that the value of the home must have declined by roughly 80% of the appraised home
value. In contrast, the control group lost slightly less of the original balance despite
having a higher mean LTV.
1.4 Main Results
Section 1.4 presents the main results for total and excess losses to foreclosure
caused by fraudulent Liar's Loans. The main findings in this section are that total
and excess losses in foreclosure due to fraud were substantial, prolonged, and con-
centrated in neighborhoods particularly poorly suited to bear the losses. Losses to
foreclosure for the entire private label RMBS market totaled roughly $500 billion from
2007-2012. Roughly 70%, or $345 billion, of these losses are accounted for by losses
in no/low documentation Liar's Loans. Of this $345 billion, roughly $100 billion can
be considered a conservative lower bound estimate for excess losses. This implies that
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excess losses in Liar's Loans alone account for 20% of total market losses. Fourty-four
percent of total market losses occurred in ZIP codes above the 75th percentile of fraud-
lent income overstatement. These neighborhoods were already economically fragile
before the financial crisis and experienced terrible economic performance through-
out the Great Recession. The prolonged foreclosure crisis was a significant factor in
explaining this poor performance.
The results in this section are presented in two tables and one figure. Table
1.3 presents estimates of excess foreclosures, delinquencies, and losses conditional on
foreclosure. Table 1.4 uses these estimates to calculate total and excess losses at the
level of the entire market. Finally, Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of these losses
through time.
Table 1.3. Main Results: Excess Negative Outcomes for Liar's Loans in Pooled
Sample
No Controls Some Controls Preferred Unrefined
Loss ($) 26083.4∗∗∗ 21290.1∗∗∗ 22912.3∗∗∗ 11112.8∗∗∗
(22.61) (20.05) (29.02) (42.98)
Loss/Orig Balance 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0906∗∗∗ 0.0911∗∗∗ 0.0359∗∗∗
(20.43) (18.47) (28.27) (42.84)
N 390289 390289 390289 671567
Foreclosure Rate (% 0.0269∗∗∗ 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0175∗∗∗
(22.53) (27.86) (27.68) (55.51)
Delinquency Rate (%) 0.0903∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.0980∗∗∗ 0.0812∗∗∗
(26.28) (48.33) (48.54) (103.13)
N 3899597 3899597 3899597 7018803
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.3 shows the main results for excess foreclosures, delinquencies, and losses
conditional on foreclosure for Liar's Loans in the pooled sample. The table presents
results from regressions of the outcomes on the no/low documentation indicator,
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with 1) no controls, 2) risk controls only, 3) all controls, and 4) the unrefined full
documentation control group with all controls. Specifications one to three move from
least saturated to most saturated models, with the most saturated model being the
preferred estimate. The unrefined specification is included to allow us to assess the
the size of the effects of the refinements. Specification one regresses each outcome
on the treatment indicator, and only controls for the size of the original balance.
Specification 2 also includes sets of controls for the LTV ratio, FICO score, loan
purpose, and loan type. Finally, specification three also includes ZIP code level fixed
effects, indicators for origination year, and loan-year observation fixed effects.
All specifications in this table show statistically and economically significant re-
sults for all outcomes. The results are also reasonably consistent across specifications.
The preferred estimate in this table shows that the conditional foreclosure rate was
roughly 2.1 percentage points higher than that for the control group. This result
implies that fraud caused a 30% relative increase in foreclosures compared to the
control group foreclosure rate of 7.5%, or equivalently that roughly one-fifth of Liar's
Loans foreclosures were excess. Excess losses conditional on foreclosure in dollar val-
ues for the preferred specification were just under $23,000. To the extent that the
risk controls do not completely eliminate COP selection bias, this represents an un-
derestimate of the true causal effects. However, the size of this estimate is plausible
and consistent with descriptions of the size of the average fraud in the literature. In
the example of appraisal inflation presented by Ben-David (2011), the price of the
home was inflated $20,000. Excess losses as a share of the original balance for the
preferred specification were 9 percentage points of the original balance. The average
loss as a share of the original balance for the refined control group was 50%. This
implies that Liar's Loans lost 20% more conditional on foreclosure than the control
group average.
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Excess foreclosures estimated for the unrefined control group are also consistent
with those estimated for the refined group. The increase in the foreclosure rate
for this specification was 1.75 percentage points, which is similar to that estimated
for the refined model. Excess losses conditional on foreclosure were just under half
as large as those estimated for the refined specification. The difference in losses
suggests that the refinements did meaningfully reduce the incidence of fraud in the
unrefined control group. This also helps to assess how sensitive the final results are
to the refinements employed. As discussed in greater depth in the next section on
robustness test, estimates from other alternative refinements fall in between estimates
using fully-refined and unrefined control groups.
Excess delinquencies were also large and consistently averaged just under 10 per-
centage points across specifications. This increase is quite substantial at roughly 25%
greater than the average delinquency rate of 38% for the refined control group. Ad-
ditionally, the estimates of excess delinquencies are within the range of estimates in
the existing research. The increase is slightly higher than the 5 - 8 percentage point
increase reported by Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil (2014) which was based on their
unrefined full documentation control group. However, the increase in excess delin-
quencies was less than the 50% - 60% increase in the delinquency rates estimated by
Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015) and Griffin and Maturana (2016). These results
were produced by directly observing fraud and are therefore the most credible in the
literature. This suggests that the refinements made to the full documentation control
group may not have completely eliminated the presence of fraud. That being said,
the increase in excess losses to foreclosure estimated with the refined group was larger
than this increase. This suggests that unrefined and refined estimates provide a rea-
sonable bracket for the true effects, assuming that COP selection bias is mitigated by
the inclusion of risk controls.
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Table 1.4. Total and Excess Losses to Foreclosure for the Entire Private Label
RMBS Market from 2007-2012
Panel A: Total Losses and Foreclosures
Full CCF Entire Market
Foreclosed Balance (billions $)
All Loans $321.54 $892.95
Liar's Loans $220.05 $611.10
Losses to Original Balance in Foreclosure (billions $)
All Loans $179.51 $498.51
Liar's Loans $125.06 $347.30
Total Foreclosures
All Loans 1,473,244 4,091,345
Liar's Loans 890,960 2,474,284
Panel B: Excess Losses and Foreclosures in Liar's Loans
Full CCF Entire Market
Losses due to Extra Foreclosures (billions $) $25.63 $71.16
Total Liar's Loans Excess Foreclosures 182,560 506,986
Average Loss in Foreclosure $140,384 -
Excess Losses in Foreclosure (billions $)
Unrefined $7.87 $21.86
Refined $16.23 $45.08
Total Excess Losses (billions $)
Unrefined $33.50 $93.02
Refined $41.86 $116.24
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Table 1.4 shows total and excess losses from 2007-2012 projected to the level of
the entire market using the average CCF market share. Panel A shows total losses
and foreclosures. The total foreclosed balance in the CCF was $321.5 billion, which
implies a total market foreclosed balance of almost $900 billion. Over half of this
foreclosed balance was not recovered through foreclosure auctions. Losses for Liar's
Loans accounted for 70% of total losses, and 40% of the foreclosed balance. Raw
numbers of foreclosures were also substantial at 1.5 million in the CCF, and 4 million
for the entire market. In comparison, estimates of the total number of foreclosures
for the financial crisis and Great Recession suggest that roughly 5 million foreclosures
occurred, and an additional 5 million home forfeiture actions similar to foreclosures
occurred.18 Therefore, the CCF dataset accounts for roughly 15% of total home
forfeiture actions that occurred, and the private label market accounts for roughly
40%.
Panel B presents the total amount of excess losses and foreclosures implied by
the regression results, which are substantial. Excess losses due to extra foreclosures
and excess losses conditional on foreclosure are presented seperately, as well as the
total effect. To project the findings from the sample to the level of the full CCF,
the average loss conditional on foreclosure for Liar's Loans in the full CCF is used,
roughly $140,000. This is less than the sample average Liar's Loan loss of 180,000
largely because LTV ratios of less than 70 were omitted from the sample.19
Excess losses due to extra foreclosures is simply the number of excess foreclosures
times the average loss in foreclosure. This is not presented seperately for refined and
unrefined groups because the regression estimates implied similar amounts of excess
foreclosures for these groups. Roughly 20% of Liar's Loans foreclosures were excess,
18http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/10/foreclosure-crisis-update.html
19Excess losses for the market using the sample average loss of $180,000 total roughly $112-$135
billion for the unrefined and refined control groups respectively.
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Figure 1.5. Total and Excess Losses Caused by Liar's Loans from 2007-2012
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which implies that over 500,000 Liar's Loans foreclosures at the level of the market
were excess. The effect due to extra foreclosures totaled $71 billion for the market,
which is where the bulk of excess losses occured. The effect due to loss conditional on
foreclosure is the loss conditional in foreclosure times the number of non-excess Liar's
Loans foreclosures. At the level of the market, the loss conditional on foreclosure
effect ranged between $21-$45 billion. These results imply total losses ranging from
$93-$112 billion for this market. Total excess losses account for 40% of total Liar's
Loans losses, and 20% of total market losses. While these losses are quite substantial,
it is worth re-emphasizing that they are best seen as a conservative lower bound.
Figure 1.5 shows the level of total market losses, total Liar's Loans losses, and
excess Liar's Loans losses for each year from 2007-2012. This figure is significant be-
cause it shows that the bulk of losses to foreclosure were substantially more prolonged
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than the financial crisis. The market panic had largely subsided by 2009. However
there were over $125 billion in losses to foreclosure in 2009, and between $75-100
billion in losses in each year from 2010-2012. These losses were disproportionately
concentrated in geographic areas that were economically fragile before the crisis, and
help to explain the lack of recovery in these areas.
Fully 44% of these losses, or close to $220 billion, occurred in ZIP codes above
the 75th percentile of fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications.20
Similar to the findings for the entire market, 70% of total losses can be accounted for
by Liar's Loans. These prolonged losses are significant for the lack of recovery in these
areas because existing research has shown that foreclosures have substantial negative
externalities. Foreclosure sales cause house prices, and thus wealth, to decline for
every home in the neighborhood, which depresses local aggregate demand. Mian,
Sufi and Trebbi (2015) find that the causal effects of foreclosures can account for one-
third of the total fall in house prices, one-fifth of the decline in residential investment,
and one-fifth of the decline in auto sales. These effects contributed to the terrible
performance of high income overstatement ZIP codes. Mian and Sufi (2015) found
that these ZIP codes experienced negative income growth from 2005-2012, as well as
increases in poverty and unemployment.
1.5 Robustness Analysis
Section 1.5 discusses the robustness of the main results presented in section 1.4.
This section discusses the robustness of the results to different model specifications
and the sensitivity of estimates to different levels of control group refinement, and
formally tests for coefficient stability to bias from unobservable confounders using
20The measure of income overstatement used in this paper is slightly different than that in Mian
and Sufi (2015). The measure used in this paper matches census tracts to ZIP codes through the
free program developed by the Missouri Data Center as in Adelino, Schoar and Severino (2015),
rather than the proprietary bridging used in Mian and Sufi (2015).
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the analysis developed in Oster (2014). Overall, the main results hold up well across
different specifications or levels of refinement, and are stable to bias due to unobserv-
ables.
The main results presented in section 1.4 are reasonably robust to model specifica-
tions with different geographic levels of fixed effects and different sample restrictions,
and across loan types or purposes. The estimates are robust to including either state
or county level fixed effects, which both produce slightly larger estimates than ZIP
code level fixed effects. To an extent, ZIP code level fixed effects represent a conserva-
tive assumption, because it is known that fraud was clustered by ZIP code. Therefore
the fixed effects may pick up some of the effect that is rightly attributed to the treat-
ment indicator. These estimates are also consistent in the unrestricted full sample.
Finally, the estimates are robust across loan types and purposes, with coefficients
similar to those estimated in the full sample. In general, fixed rate loans, refinance,
and cash-out refinance loans showed excess losses slightly larger than those previously
estimated, while ARM mortgages and primary purchase loans showed excess losses
that were slightly less.
The estimates are also reasonably robust to different levels of refinement. Un-
refined and refined full documentation control groups produce estimates that range
from $93 - $112 billion. This range brackets estimates produced by different levels of
refinement. For example, the semi-refined group produces an estimate close to $100
billion. Other alternative refinement restrictions also fall in this range. For example,
I was concerned that refining the control group by removing loans from high fraud
originators inadvertently removed too much data because only half of the observa-
tions had data for originator name, while all observations had servicer name data. To
make sure that this was not the case, I coded the servicers for high fraud servicers and
reintroduced the data that was dropped. The results for the semi-refined and fully
refined group for this model were slightly larger than $100 billion. Therefore, it is
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reasonable to conclude that the range of estimates given by the unrefined and refined
control groups credibly bracket the sensitivity of the estimates to different levels of
refinements.
While the visual comparison of the estimates produced by differing levels of con-
trols in Table 1.3 suggest that the estimates are reasonably stable, it is still useful
to formally test for coefficient stability using the method developed in Oster (2014).
This analysis formally tests for the stability of coefficients to bias due to unobserv-
able confounders by comparing co-movements in coefficients and R2 in models which
include and exclude controls. The bias adjusted coefficients are defined as:
β = βlong − (βshort − βlong) (R
2
max−R2long)
R2long−R2short
,
where β is the bias adjusted beta, βlong and R
2
long are the coefficient and R
2
from the regression which includes controls, βshort and R
2
short are the coefficient and
R2 from the regression without controls, and R2max is the maximum R
2. The short
regressions correspond to the no control model specification in Table 3, while the long
regressions correspond to the preferred specification. The test is performed under the
assumption of equal selection, which assumes unobservables are equally as important
as observables. Additionally, the test uses the recommended R2max of 1.3 ∗ R2long. As
described in Oster (2014), this assumption for R2max is conservative because only 90%
of true results estimated using constructed data survive this threshold.
Table 1.5. Results from Oster Bias Adjustment for Fully Refined Estimates
Loss ($) Loss/Original Balance Foreclosure (%) Delinquency (%)
Adjusted Coefficient 19124 .08615 .01908 .1003
This test shows that the estimates are stable and that any bias due to unobserv-
ables is likely slight. All bias adjusted coefficients are quite close to non-adjusted
coefficients. The estimate of excess losses conditional on foreclosure is still close to
$20,000. The adjusted foreclosure rate is still roughly 2 percentage points. Losses as
40
a share of the original balance are within a half percentage point of the non-adjusted
estimate. Finally, the delinquency rate is slightly higher than the non-adjusted esti-
mate. Therefore this test suggests that any bias due to unobservables is slight even
if we assume that unobservables are equally as important as observables.
The estimates produced in this paper are stable across specifications and robust
to different modeling assumptions. However, it needs to be emphasized that these
estimates are best interpreted as conservative lower bounds for the true causal effect
of fraud on excess losses to foreclosure for three main reasons. First, the refinements
may not have completely removed fraud from the control group because the estimates
of excess delinquencies are still much lower than those estimated in research that di-
rectly observes fraud. Second, the COP selection bias is likely not entirely mitigated
by the inclusion of controls for risk. This understatement is also concerning because
the effects from loss conditional in foreclosure were substantially less than those due to
extra foreclosures. Finally, the sample appears broadly representative of the market
in terms of risk measures, and also contains a broad portion of the market. However,
there is reason to believe that the practices at Wells Fargo may have been less fraud-
ulent than average for the market. For these reasons, the estimates may understate
the true effects of fraud. While these estimates of show that a substantial portion of
the losses in this market are due to fraud, they are best interpreted as a conservative
lower bound.
1.6 Conclusion
The findings in this paper and the broader research on fraud have shown deep
seated problems with deception in the structure of financial intermediation. Accurate
disclosure of the quality of collateral backing securities is a minimum condition for
the basic functioning of asset markets. However, this condition was not met on a
widespread basis, with disastrous consequences. These problems with deception led
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to historic losses of wealth for savers who invested their retirement funds in these
bogus securities, for borrowers who were given mortgages that were counter to their
best interests, and for the communities which experienced the prolonged foreclosure
crisis. Losses in no/low documentation Liar's Loans account for 70% of total losses
to foreclosure in the data. A conservative lower bound estimate for excess losses sug-
gests that $100 billion, or roughly 30% of total Liar's Loans losses, can be considered
excess. Moreover, 44% of total losses occurred in ZIP codes with the highest levels
of fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications. These areas were par-
ticularly poorly suited to bear these losses, and the prolonged losses to foreclosure
in these neighborhoods helps to explain the terrible economic performance of these
areas throughout the Great Recession.
Borrowers and savers lacked sufficient protections against fraud in part because,
at the time, the dominant view was that these protections were unneccesary. It was
argued that in a free market a financial institution's interest in maintaining their rep-
utation would be sufficient to prevent dishonest activities on a large scale. Moreover,
complex financial innovations were seen as efficiency enhancing because they allowed
prices to more fully reflect new information about fundamentals. A sad irony of the
financial crisis is that at precisely the time that these arguments were being made,
all of the major financial institutions involved in the sale of mortgages were falsifying
and misrepresenting the information needed to accurately price these innovations.
Instead of reputation providing incentives for honest dealing, the reputation of the
major financial institutions was used to support the deception by making investors
less suspicious of the securities they purchased (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015).
In light of the widespread problems revealed by the financial crisis, the dominant
pre-crisis view of the impossibility of dishonest practices should be seen as naive,
and now discredited. To address these problems will require the creation of new
protections for borrowers and savers, as well as more aggressive enforcement of existing
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protections. Moreover, financial regulation needs to prioritize increased monitoring of
financial institutions, limit extreme executive compensation, and criminally prosecute
financial institution senior executives engaged in deception and fraud.
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CHAPTER 2
PUNISHMENT OR FORGIVENESS? LOAN
MODIFICATIONS IN PRIVATE LABEL RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES FROM 2008-2014
2.1 Introduction
A major factor contributing to the Great Recession and weak recovery in the U.S.,
from 2008-2014, was instability in the household mortgage market. Following historic
declines in house prices, the default rate on household mortgages increased from the
historical average of 2% to a high of 11% in 2010.1 These defaults resulted in waves
of foreclosures that were highly costly to borrowers who lost their homes, investors
in securities or derivatives based on these loans, and the communities in which the
foreclosures occurred. When facing a large number of defaults, a standard tool for
preventing foreclosures is modifying delinquent mortgages to forgive debt. Forgiving
debt mitigates losses through preventing foreclosures, and provides economic stim-
ulus through deleveraging borrowers. However, mortgages can also be modified to
increase debt, instead of forgiving it, through capitalizing missed interest payments
and fees. Increasing debt reduces the effectiveness of modifications at loss mitigation
and providing stimulus.
This paper examines the extent to which voluntary modification of privately se-
curitized mortgages either increased or forgave debt during the Great Recession and
weak recovery from 2008-2014. I focus on loans used as collateral for mortgage-backed
1Data on the delinquency rate for U.S. household mortgages is available from the St. Louis
Federal Reserve FRED database. Accessed June 15th, 2016 from: http://research.stlouisfed.org/
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private label securities (PLS), because this is where the largest portion of defaults
occurred. The market for residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) in the U.S.
is divided into two portions: agency and non-agency. Agency RMBS are securities
issued by government sponsored entities, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Non-
agency RMBS, also known as private label RMBS, are those securities issued by the
private institutions. The PLS market is where the bulk of subprime mortgages were
securitized, and hence where the largest portion of defaults occurred. I account for
the increase or decrease in debt due to modifications using a loan-level panel dataset
which covers roughly 30%-40% of the PLS market, depending on year.
There are three primary findings in this paper. First, the total net increase to
borrower debt balances due to modifications for the entire PLS market from 2008-
2014 was $20 billion. Second, the net amount of debt added per modification grew
from 2010-2014, roughly doubling from 5.6% to 11.3% of the original balance. Fi-
nally, I find that the growth in the amount of debt added per modification is not
consistent with capitalization of increased numbers of missed interest payments, be-
cause the number of missed interest payments per modification remained constant
from 2010-2014. Therefore, the growth in the amount of debt added is consistent
with increased capitalization of fees such as delinquency fees. Additionally, my data
show that modifications which reduced debt were rare, with only 5% of modifications
resulting in net reductions of debt. Also, foreclosures were much more common than
modifications, with 88% more foreclosures occurring. These foreclosures were highly
costly, with losses ranging from 45%-65% of the original loan balance, and totaling
almost $600 billion from 2008-2014. In contrast, the gross amount of forgiveness only
totaled $18.8 billion. The large difference between losses to foreclosure and debt for-
given suggests that there was ample room to increase forgiveness to mitigate losses
to foreclosure.
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To be sure, 75% of modifications in my sample did reduce borrower monthly pay-
ments, and so provided some relief even if increasing debt balances. However, through
increasing negative equity, the increase in debt by modifications blunted the ability of
modifications to mitigate losses or provide economic stimulus. Modifications that in-
creased debt impeded loss mititgation because they had significantly higher redefault
rates than those that reduced debt (Haughwout, Okah and Tracy, 2009). Moreover,
increasing negative equity, rather than eliminating it through debt forgiveness, guar-
anteed that redefaults would result in costly foreclosure because the borrower could
not sell the home without paying the lender the difference between the amount owed
and the sale price.
Increasing negative equity also reduced the stimulative effects of debt restruc-
turing. First, increasing negative equity did not reduce the need for substantial
cuts in borrower spending to deleverage and rebuild lost savings. Negative equity
also reduced the effectiveness of monetary policy because it prevented the borrower
from gaining access to external finance, such as refinancing at lower interest rates
(Mian and Sufi, 2014). Negative equity also reduced aggregate demand by reducing
the incentive to invest in the household, because all gains would go to the lender.
Haughwout, Sutherland and Tracy (2013) find that from 2007-2012, households with
negative equity decreased residential investment by 75%. Finally, the increased re-
default rate led to more foreclosures with substantial negative externalities for the
communities in which they occurred. Foreclosures reduce house prices for all homes
in the community, thus further depressing aggregate demand. Mian, Sufi and Trebbi
(2015) find that the causal effects of foreclosures can account for roughly one-third
of the decline in house prices, one-fifth of the decline in residential investment, and
one-fifth of the decline in auto sales from 2007-2009.
The findings in this paper are also consistent with reports of a principal-agent
problem between investors in privately securitized mortgages, and the servicers of
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these loans who are responsible for processing payments and managing defaults (Lev-
itin and Twomey, 2011; Thompson, 2011; COP, 2009). This principal-agent problem
is caused by the perverse incentives built-in to the servicers' cost-plus compensation
structure once a loan enters default. Servicers' compensation structure does not align
their interests with the investors' interest in maintaining the net present value of the
loan. Instead, servicers' compensation is based on three main parts. First, servicers
receive a fee assessed on the unpaid principal balance of the loan. Second, servicers
receive float income based on the time in which the servicers receive payments from
borrowers, but have not yet remitted them. Finally, once a loan enters into default,
servicers are able to receive income from a diverse array of fees, including but not
limited to late fees, title search fees, property maintenance fees, appraisal fees, and
other fees related to the foreclosure. These fees are paid by lenders in addition to
borrowers, because the fees can be recovered through the proceeds of foreclosure sales
prior to lenders receiving any revenue. The ability to assess these fees effectively
creates a cost-plus compensation structure with little oversight.
The misalignment of servicer and investor interests caused two forms of perverse
incentives directly relevant to the interpretation of the findings in this paper. First,
this compensation structure can make foreclosure more profitable to servicers than
modifying, even when modifying is in the best interest of investors, because they
can charge expensive fees with little oversight. Second, when servicers do modify,
they favor modifications that increase borrower indebtedness through capitalizing
missed interest payments and fees, because these will increase their income based on
a fixed-rate of the unpaid principal balance. These type of modifications are not in
investors' interests because they have a high redefault rate. However, servicers are
able to receive additional income from these redefaults through charging additional
fees (Levitin and Twomey, 2011; Thompson, 2011; COP, 2009). The findings in this
paper of the increase in debt added per modification being driven by fees, as well as the
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larger frequency of foreclosure than modifications, even when foreclosures produced
large losses, are consistent with these perverse incentives.
This work extends the previous findings of White (2008) and a 2010 study by the
Congressional Oversight Panel (COP, 2010) to cover the entire course of the recovery
from the Great Recession, from 2010-2014. These earlier papers found that 68% of
voluntary modifications of privately securitized mortgages (White, 2008), and 95%
of modifications done through the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)
(COP, 2010) during 2008 and 2010, respectively, increased borrower debt balances by
roughly 5%. My findings extend this analysis by showing that the increase in debt
added per modification doubled from 2010-2014, and calculating the total amount of
debt added by modifications throughout the Great Recession and weak recovery. My
findings show that the problems identified in these previous papers worsened during
the subsequent years. Indeed, the total net addition to debt balances was larger in
2014 than in any other year in the sample, with the exception of the peak crisis year
of 2010.
The remainder of this paper is organized into two sections. The first section
reviews the relevant literature and background information needed to understand the
results. The second section presents the data description and main findings.
2.2 Literature Review and Background Information
This section presents a review of the relevant literature and discusses the back-
ground information necessary to understand the main results. This section begins by
discussing the role of loan modifications in mitigating losses to foreclosure. I then
describe in further depth the market failure of the principal-agent problem between
servicers and investors outlined in the introduction, and how it caused an inefficient
level of loss mitigation in privately securitized loans.
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Loan modifications which reduce debt are seen as a standard tool for loss miti-
gation. In general, household debt forgiveness produces mutually beneficial gains to
both borrower and lender through avoiding high costs associated with foreclosure.
Houses sold in foreclosure typically sell at steep discounts, averaging roughly 27% of
the home price, for two main reasons. First, housing is a classic example of an illiquid
asset, but financial institutions typically have an incentive to sell a home as rapidly
as possible once it enters foreclosure. Therefore, forced sales require larger discounts
than if the market were fully liquid. Second, the house may also have become phys-
ically damaged during the foreclosure process (Campbell, Giglio and Pathak, 2011).
Moreover, foreclosures also have negative externalities that lower prices for all homes
in the neighborhood. Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2015) estimate that the causal effects of
foreclosures can account for roughly one-third of the total decline in home values from
2007-2009. They also estimate that the destruction of wealth from these foreclosures
also lowered aggregate demand, accounting for one-fifth in the reduction of residential
investment and auto sales during this period.
Estimates during the Great Recession showed that the mutually beneficial gains
to avoiding foreclosure could have been substantial. For example, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) analyzed different options for principal reduction for delinquent
borrowers who have mortgages owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
They found that debt forgiveness sufficient to reduce loan-to-value (LTV) ratios to 100
or 90 percent through principal reduction could have saved Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac $2.8 billion for reducing the LTV to 100, or $2.1 billion for reducing the LTV to
90. Therefore, even if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had undertaken loan modifications
for delinquent borrowers that were generous enough to give the borrowers 10% equity
in their home (i.e. to reduce the LTV to 90), they would still have saved slightly
over $2 billion. Giving the borrower positive equity in their home would also have
prevented a foreclosure if the modification redefaulted, because the borrower could
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sell their home without having to pay the lender the difference between the sale price
and the amount owed on the home (Moore and Remy, 2013).
Due to mutually beneficial gains to avoiding foreclosure, lenders tend to look for
alternatives including modifying the original terms of the loan to forgive some portion
of the debt. However, several problems in the structure of private label securitization
prevented modifications in loans used as collateral for these securities, even in cases
where modification was efficient for both borrower and investor. First, mortgages held
in securitization pools are governed by a contract known as a pooling and servicing
agreement (PSA). These contracts define the roles and responsibilities of all parties
to the securitization, such as the transfers of the loans into the trust, management
of the trust, issuance of securities to investors, servicing of the loans, and permissible
actions that can be taken once a loan is in default. However, research has shown that
roughly 40% of securitized mortgages are governed by PSAs with some clause that
restricts servicer modification ability (Gelpern and Levitin, 2009).
Second and more relevant to the interpretation of the results in this paper, there
is also a principal-agent problem between servicers and investors that impedes re-
structuring even when it was in the investor's interest. Servicer's compensation is not
aligned with the investors interest in maximizing the net present value of the loan.
Instead, servicer's choice of modification or foreclosure, and type of modification, is
based on the incentives in their own compensation structure. Servicers receive three
main types of income: a fixed-rate fee based on the unpaid principal balance of a
loan; float income from the period in which the servicer receives monthly payments
but has not remitted them to the trust; and ancillary fees. The main types of ancillary
fees include delinquency fees and reimbursement for costs associated with foreclosure,
such as property maintenance fees, title search fees, process serving fees, appraisal
fees, other legal fees, or any of a number of other fees. There is no effective oversight
of the reasonableness of these fees, and servicers are able to be reimbursed for these
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fees out of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale prior to any revenue being given to
investors. This misalignment of incentives creates two related problems which prevent
efficient restructuring (Levitin and Twomey, 2011; Thompson, 2011; COP, 2009).
First, these fees can be quite lucrative and create an incentive to foreclose, even
when it is in the investors best interest to modify, because modification is costly.
Modification is costly for three reasons. First, modifications require substantial labor
costs such as reunderwriting the loan. Second, if the modification reduces monthly
payments through reducing the unpaid principal balance, the servicer loses its fixed
rate fee. Third, servicers must advance missed payments while the loan is delinquent.
They can recoup these advances in cases of foreclosure or if the loan becomes current,
but not in many types of modifications. In contrast, the fees associated with managing
delinquency and foreclosure can be quite lucrative. For example, analysis of one major
servicer, Ocwen, showed that late fees and loan collection fees made up 18% of it's
revenue in 2008 (Thompson, 2011). There can also be an incentive to keep a borrower
delinquent so that the servicer can receive revenue from delinquency fees, until the
cost of financing advances outweighs the revenue received from the fees. This has been
described as keeping the borrower in a default fee sweatbox (Levitin and Twomey,
2011). Essentially, the servicer's choice between modification and foreclosure is a
choice between limited fixed-price income and a cost-plus contract arrangement with
no oversight of either the costs or the plus components, (COP, 2009). Even worse
for the investor, this cost-plus structure creates an incentive to foreclose in a more
costly manner than less, because servicer's compensation is positively related to costs
and has the senior claim on foreclosure sale revenue. Cost-plus compensation is
typically banned from government contracts due to these perverse incentives (Levitin
and Twomey, 2011; COP, 2009).
The second problem created by this compensation structure is that it provides
incentives for servicers to choose types of modifications that promote their own inter-
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ests, even if these modifications have a higher redefault rate and hence do not promote
the investor's interests. For example, reducing monthly payments through principal
reduction has been shown to be the most effective form of modification at preventing
redefaults (Haughwout, Okah and Tracy, 2009; Goodman et al., 2012). However,
servicers are disincentivized to perform principal reduction because it reduces the
amount of revenue they receive from their fixed-rate servicer fee, which is assessed on
the unpaid principal balance of the loan. In contrast, servicers prefer modifications
that increase the unpaid principal balance of the loan through capitalizing missed in-
terest payments and fees because this increases the revenue from their fixed-rate fee.
But these modifications that increase borrower indebtedness have higher redefault
rates, which result in costly foreclosure for investors. Providing unsustainable modifi-
cations designed to redefault can also be a source of profit for servicers, because they
can receive the lucrative foreclosure fees described above (Thompson, 2011; COP,
2009).
An obvious question is what is preventing market competition from correcting the
principal-agent problem by creating incentives for good servicers who can meet the
needs of investors? Market competition is unlikely to self-correct the misalignment of
incentives because of information and collective action problems. Investors faced two
main collective action problems in changing this structure. First, many PSAs had
collective action clauses requiring a super majority of investors to amend any contrac-
tual terms. However, there were typically large numbers of geographically dispersed
investors party to most of the major securitizations. Second, the investors often had
different interests regarding the type of loan modification they would desire because
they received compensation based on different parts of the cash flow, such as princi-
pal or interest payments. Therefore, some modifications would be favorable to some
subset of investors, while wiping out a different subset of investors. Even if investors
could overcome the collective action problem, they also lacked the necessary data to
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evaluate loss mitigation practices of servicers, such as loan-level data concerning the
reunderwriting of modifications. Moreover, investors typically lacked detailed infor-
mation on the amount of fees being assessed by servicers. These collective action and
information problems effectively undermined investors ability to perform meaningful
oversight of servicers (Levitin and Twomey, 2011).
The cumulative effect of market failures in the structure of securitization was
to make the level of modification for loans in this market inefficiently low. The
difference in the amount modifications between securitized loans and loans held in
bank portfolios suggest that modifications for securitized loans are inefficiently low.
Recent estimates have shown the mortgages held in private securitization pools were
less likely to be modified than loans held in banks portfolios, by 26%-36% (Agarwal
et al., 2011) or 13%-32% (Piskorski, Seru and Vig, 2010). Additionally, Maturana
(2016) found that an additional modification for the marginal loan reduced losses
by 40% relative to the average loss. This suggests that the marginal benefits to
modification were substantially higher than the marginal costs, which implies that
the level of modifications was inefficiently low. Substantial losses for borrowers and
lenders alike could have been avoided through modifications rather than foreclosures.
The perverse incentives in servicers' compensation also helps to explain why the
public intervention to promote more modifications through the Home Affordable Mod-
ification Program (HAMP) fell short of it's stated goals. The HAMP program sought
to induce more voluntary modifications through providing incentive payments to ser-
vicers for performing more modifications. However, when compared to the possible fee
compensation from foreclosing, these incentives were too small to promote an efficient
level of modifications (Levitin and Twomey, 2011). The initial HAMP program was
created in 2008 and designed to provide roughly 3-4 million modifications. However,
five years into the Great Recession, it had only provided 860,000 permanent modifi-
cations (Mian and Sufi, 2014). In addition to the principal-agent problem, another
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reason for the failure of HAMP is that many servicers simply lacked the capacity to
handle the necessary volume of modifications (Agarwal et al., 2012).
The incentives in the servicers' compensation structure also caused a large portion
of the voluntary modifications in the PLS market which did occur to be unsustainable
because they often increased borrower debt balances and monthly payments. A study
of voluntary PLS modifications found less than half of the modifications reduced
monthly payments. Moreover, 68% of modifications increased borrower debt balances
by capitalizing unpaid interest and fees. The average amount capitalized was $10,800
on a balance of $225,000. In contrast, only 10% of these modifications included
principal reduction (White, 2008).
Voluntary modifications through the HAMP program also resulted in increasing
borrower debt balances. However this was largely due to program design. The HAMP
program did prohibit the capitalization of delinquency fees, however the program also
mandated capitalization of missed interest payments. The HAMP program then re-
duced borrowers monthly payments through a combination of interest rate reductions
and term extensions. Overall, reports showed that 95% of HAMP modifications in-
creased borrower negative equity by roughly 5%. Redefault rates were also quite
high. For some of the early vintages of HAMP modifcations, close to 50% redefaulted
within the first year (COP, 2010, 2009). The previous studies of White (2008) and
COP (2010) which documented modifications increasing borrower debt balances are
the closest studies to the analysis in this paper.
The perverse servicer incentives are relevant to the interpretation of redistribu-
tion inherent in modifications in two ways. First, to the extent that the increase in
debt balances represents the imposition of arbitrary fees by servicers due to cost-plus
compensation, the increase in debt balances can be unambiguously interpreted as
an increase in total borrower debt obligations. This is relevant because some have
interpreted capitalization of missed interest payments alone as not increasing total
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borrower obligations (COP, 2010). The findings in the next section will show that
a substantial portion of the increase in debt is consistent with increases in punitive
fees, but not increases in missed interest payments. Therefore, a large portion of the
findings can be interpreted as an increase in total borrower obligations.
Second, the perverse servicer incentives are also relevant to the interpretation
distribution of losses from the housing bubble which is inherent in the restructuring
of mortgage debt. Debt contracts are inherently distributional in that they specify
that borrower equity takes the first losses from house price declines. In this context,
the distributional conflict at the root of the renegotiation of debt terms was which
party would bear the losses from the collapse of house prices. Would debtors be made
to bear the all losses from the house price decline, or would there be a more equitable
split between borrowers and investors (Mian and Sufi, 2014; Farhi and Werning,
2013)?
The outcome of this renegotiation was that modifications would concentrate all
losses from the house price decline on debtors. If borrower equity was insufficient to
absorb these losses, the borrower would be left with negative equity. In addition to
taking all losses from the house price declines, debtors would take additional punitive
losses due to delinquency or other fees imposed upon them by servicers. However,
the choice to essentially punish debtors for the house price collapse, rather than to
forgive them, resulted for larger losses for investors as well. It appears that the only
party that benefited from this destruction of wealth was servicers. In effect, it was
in their interest to destroy wealth by making the foreclosure process costlier through
the imposition of arbitrary fees.
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2.3 The Increase in Borrower Debt Balances from PLS Mod-
ifications
Two early reports suggested that voluntary modifications tended to increase bor-
rower debt balances by capitalizing missed interest payments and fees (White, 2008;
COP, 2010). However, to my knowledge no study has provided a systematic descrip-
tion of whether voluntary modifications continued to increase borrower debt balances
throughout the course of the recovery from the Great Recession, and if so, by how
much. This study seeks to contribute to the literature on household balance sheets
by providing a systematic description of the increase in borrower debt balances by
loan modifications in the PLS market from 2008-2014.
There are three primary findings in this paper. First, for the entire PLS market
from 2008-2014, loan modifications resulted in a total net increase to borrower debt
balances of $20 billion. Second, the amount of net debt added per modification grew
from 2010-2014, roughly doubling from 5.6% to 11.3% of the original balance, or
$16,000-$26,000. Finally, the growth in amount added per modification is consistent
with growth in fees assessed by servicers, but not increased numbers of missed interest
payments, because the number of missed interest payments per modification remained
constant from 2010-2014. This resulted in the average amount of capitalization per
delinquency increasing from $1,761 to $3,488 from 2010-2014. This finding suggests
that the growth in net debt added per modification from 2010-2014 is consistent with
the agency problems due to servicer's cost-plus compensation structure described in
the previous section. This also implies that the increase in borrower debt balances
can be unambiguously interpreted as an increase in total borrower debt obligations.
My data also showed that foreclosures were much more common than modifica-
tions, with 88% more foreclosures occurring. These foreclosures were highly costly,
with losses ranging from 45%-65% of the original loan balance. In contrast, modifi-
cations which reduced debt were rare, with only 5% of modifications resulting in net
56
reductions of debt. Modifications which resulted in net forgiveness of debt were also
tightly limited to a small subset of servicers, with one servicer, Ocwen, accounting for
roughly 60% of these modifications. Finally, cumulative losses to foreclosures during
the full sample period totaled almost $600 billion, while the gross amount of forgive-
ness only totaled $18.8 billion. The large difference between losses to foreclosure and
debt forgiveness suggests that there was ample room to increase forgiveness to miti-
gate losses to foreclosure. The remainder of this section is organized into two parts.
The first part presents a basic description of the dataset, and the second presents the
main findings.
2.3.1 Data Description
This section presents the basic description of the dataset. This section includes
description of the source of data, major variables for measuring modifications and
foreclosures, major risk measures, and the restrictions used to construct the sample
from the larger dataset. The section also discusses the relation of this dataset to the
larger PLS market, and the performance of these loans through time.
The sample of loans used in this study comes from the Columbia Collateral File
(CCF), which is the same dataset used in White (2008). The CCF is a large loan-
level panel dataset that includes all loans used as collateral for private label RMBS for
whichWells Fargo is a trustee.2 The full dataset contains monthly observations for 139
variables such as loan characteristics and performance. The data begin in December
2006, which makes 2007 the first year for which complete data are available. The
number of loans and outstanding balance peaked in December 2007, with 4.2 million
loans. However, by 2014 the number of loans in the dataset had fallen to roughly
1.44 million. This is primarily due to the 1.9 million completed foreclosures which
occurred.
2This dataset is publicly available from www.ctslink.com.
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The CCF data provide several variables measuring modifications including modi-
fication date and type of forgiveness or increase of debt. The CCF added variables to
measure types of debt forgiveness or capitalization in November of 2008, which makes
2009 the first year for which we have complete data on redistribution in modifications.
Types of debt forgiveness measured include principal forgiveness, interest forgiveness,
and expense forgiveness. Total capitalized amount is the only variable which records
the amount of debt balance increase. Capitalization in modifications occurs when
missed interest payments or fees are added back to the outstanding balance of the
loan. Unfortunately, the dataset does not provide separate measures of capitalization
due to missed interest payments or fees. The data also do not include whether the
modification occurred through the HAMP program. However, servicers which sign up
for the HAMP program are required to use the HAMP template for all modifications
that meet HAMP requirements. Many of the servicers in this dataset participated
in HAMP, so it is likely that many of the modifications in the CCF data are HAMP
modifications (COP, 2010).
The variable used in this study to measure foreclosures is titled loss on liquidated
property. This variable measures the dollar value of losses to the lender due to
having to sell the home for a price below the amount of debt owed on the loan.
This variable measures any losses due to the sale of the home, which includes broader
home forfeiture actions such as short sales or deeds-in-lieu, in addition to foreclosures.
Foreclosures, short sales, and deeds-in-lieu are the three most common types of home
forfeiture actions. These actions occur when a borrower is delinquent, but the value
of the home is less than the amount owed on the loan, so that the borrower cannot sell
the home. A foreclosure occurs when the lender forces the sale of the home to repay
the value of the debt. A short sales occurs when the borrower finds a purchaser for
the home at an amount below what is owed on the loan, and then gets the lender to
consent to the sale. A deed-in-lieu of foreclosure occurs when the delinquent borrower
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signs over the deed to the lender to prevent foreclosure from occurring. The lender
will then need to sell the home. Borrowers tend to prefer short-sales or deeds-in-lieu
because they are less damaging to a borrower's credit score than foreclosure. The
results for losses to foreclosure reported in the next section are actually losses due
to home forfeiture actions more broadly defined. It is satisfactory to combine these
broader home forfeiture actions under the label of foreclosure for the purposes of
comparing losses due to home forfeiture with debt forgiveness in modifications.
The main risk measures in the dataset are the FICO credit score and the loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio. The FICO credit score is an index of creditworthiness that
measures the borrower's chance of default over the next two years, with a higher
credit score indicating a less risky borrower. The score does not provide an absolute
measure of chance of default. Instead, the score provides a ranking of a borrower's
crediworthiness relative to other borrowers. The score is based on the amount of
debt a borrower currently owes, the borrower's payment history, types of credit in
use, the length of credit history, and new credit. However, the exact formula used to
calculate how each of these categories affects a credit score is proprietary, and thus
not publicly available. Additionally, the weight given to each of these categories in
calculating the credit score differs for each individual based on their particular credit
history (Bhardwaj and Sengupta, 2015).
FICO scores range between 300-850, and are used to classify borrowers as sub-
prime, alt-A, and prime. Subprime credit scores are those with FICO scores less than
620, alt-A are between 620 and 660, and prime are greater than 660. These categories
are one factor that is used to determine what type of loan a borrower can receive,
the amount of the loan, and the interest rate of the loan. Typically, prime borrowers
qualify for the lowest interest rates and largest loans.
The LTV ratio is the ratio of the original loan balance to the appraisal value of
the home. The LTV ratio measures the amount of equity in a home which serves
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Figure 2.1. Outstanding Balance of the PLS Makret 2002-2014
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as a cushion to absorb house price declines. For example, a loan with an LTV of 80
can withstand a price decline of 20% of the value of the home before the borrower
would have negative equity in the home. If the home was sold in foreclosure after this
decline in value, the lender would typically take this loss. Traditionally, LTV ratios
of 80% or below are considered lower risk mortgages.
The growth of the outstanding balance of loans in the CCF broadly mirrors that
of the PLS market. Figure 2.1 shows the nominal yearly outstanding balance of the
PLS market and the CCF from 2002-2014. The private label market grew rapidly
from 2002 to 2007, tripling in value. After peaking at an outstanding balance of
$2.7 trillion in 2007, the market experienced severe losses and declined rapidly. As of
2014, the outstanding balance of the PLS market was $957 billion, which was roughly
equal to the 2002 outstanding balance. The CCF was not a substantial portion of
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the market until 2005. However, it grew rapidly and accounted for just under 40% of
market share in 2007, with an outstanding balance of $1.05 trillion. The outstanding
balance in the CCF then declined rapidly throughout the sample period, ending 2014
with roughly $350 billion outstanding (SIFMA, 2015).
The CCF data appear to be broadly representative of the entire market. In gen-
eral, the data account for a substantial portion of the entire market and mirrors the
growth of the market. Also, the summary statistics of observable risk measures are
similar to those reported in Griffin and Maturana (2016) and Piskorski, Seru and
Witkin (2015), who use data based on this market. Because it appears representa-
tive of the entire market, the full CCF dataset from 2008-2014 is used to produce
calculations for the entire market in Table 2.1, based on the yearly market share of
the CCF.3 Additionally, a restricted sample of loans from the CCF is used to analyze
average redistribution in modifications and losses to foreclosure. Following common
practice in the literature which analyzes the PLS market, the sample of loans from
this dataset is restricted to all mortgages that are 1st lien, owner occupied, originated
between 2002-2008, with loan-to-value ratios between 70 and 100, FICO credit scores
between 300 and 850, balances greater than $30,000, and for which there is complete
data.
These restrictions help to ensure that we are analyzing a consistent group of loans,
and to prevent data errors. Loans are limited to those that are 1st lien loans because
these are qualitatively different from junior liens. If a home is sold in foreclosure,
junior liens are only paid back once the first lien is paid in full. Due to this difference
in priority, comparing average modification and foreclosure experiences across these
groups would be less informative than focusing on 1st liens exclusively. The sample
3I use 2008-2014 for the calculations in this table, rather than the full 2006-2014, because Novem-
ber 2008 is the first month in which redistribution information is recorded for modifications. There-
fore, comparing total losses to foreclosure from 2006-2014 with total debt added in modifications
from 2008-2014 would overstate the magnitude of losses to foreclosure relative to modifications.
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is limited to owner-occupied loans because the public intervention to encourage more
modifications was designed to prevent the forfeiture of a family's primary residence,
rather than the loss of an investment property. The sample is restricted to loans
originated between 2002-2008 because these homes were at the focal point of the
foreclosure crisis. Loans are limited to LTV ratios between 70 - 100 to compare loans
with similar amounts of pre-crisis equity. The sample is limited to FICO credit scores
between 300 and 850, because this is the range of credit scores produced by FICO.
Loans outside of this range represent some type of data error. Similarly, loans are
restricted to those above $30,000, because Griffin and Maturana (2016) showed that
loans below this range contained a greater proportion of data errors.
The pooled sample is built by merging the data from the month of December
to provide a retrospective snap shot of the year. After these restrictions, the full
2006-2014 pooled sample includes 10 million loan-year observations. The sample also
includes roughly 900,000 of the 1.9 million unique foreclosures, and 515,000 of the
900,000 modifications. A large portion of foreclosures and modifications are typically
dropped from the sample during the year in which they occur, so these dropped
observations are merged back into the December observations.
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all loans, current loans, delinquent
loans, foreclosed loans, and modified loans. The basic pattern is that loans across
these groups tended to be quite similar. As expected, current loans have slightly
better risk measures than delinquent loans. Somewhat unexpectedly, modified loans
tended to have slightly worse risk measures than other groups. However, modified
loan's risk measures were still relatively close to those of the other groups.
There were roughly 1.5 million unique loans in the full sample in 2006 and 2007.
For the pooled sample, this yields 10,000,000 loan-year observations with an average
original balance of $275,000. Throughout the course of 2006-2014, roughly 40% of
loans were delinquent at least once, for a total of 4.3 million delinquent loan-year
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Table 2.1. Sample Description
Panel A: Loan Information (mean)
All Current Delinquent Foreclosed Modified
Original Balance ($) 276,663 282,970 267,957 272,698 259,552
Loan-to-Value 82.12 81.72 82.66 82.86 82.98
FICO Score 661.9 677 640.9 645.4 627.6
N 10,057,406 5,854,415 4,103,753 884,741 513,954
Panel B: Distribution of Risk Measures, Loan Type, and Purpose (%)
All Current Delinquent Foreclosed Modified
FICO Score
Sub Prime 27.4 20.6 36.9 34.3 45.9
Alt-A 21.6 19.5 24.5 25.0 25.1
Prime 51.0 60.0 38.6 41.0 29.0
Loan-to-Value
LTV <= 80 71.0 73.9 67.2 67.1 62.7
80 < LTV <= 95 19.4 17.1 22.6 22.2 26.6
95 <= LTV 9.6 9.0 10.3 10.7 10.7
Loan Type
Fixed Rate 35.7 38.2 32.1 31.1 49.7
Adjustable Rate 62.8 60.6 66.1 66.1 44.9
Loan Purpose
Purchase 47.5 48.1 46.8 48.6 40.2
Refinace 13.2 14.3 11.7 11.0 11.0
Cash-out Refinance 37.5 35.9 39.6 37.6 46.2
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Figure 2.2. Total Current Balances for Delinquent, Foreclosed, and Modified Loans
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observations. Delinquent observations in this sample are counted as any loan that
is delinquent at least once in the preceding year. During the full 2006-2014 period,
the sample contains roughly 900,000 unique foreclosures, and 515,000 unique mod-
ifications. However, about 140,000 of these modifications eventually ended up in
foreclosure.
Panel B shows the distribution of risk measures, types of loans, and purpose of
loans across these groups. As could be expected, risk measures were better for current
loans than delinquent loans. Current loans had a much higher proportion of prime
credit scores, while modified loans had the largest proportion of subprime credit
scores. Current loans also had lower LTVs than delinquent loans. Current loans and
delinquent loans tended to be more similar in terms of loan types and purposes. The
exception is modified loans, which had a largest proportions of fixed rate mortgages
and cash-out refinances.
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Figure 2.2 provides data on the performance of loans in the sample from 2006-
2014.4 The figure shows the total balances of loans that are current, delinquent,
foreclosed, and modified. The table shows the level of delinquencies as well as the
distribution of delinquency actions between foreclosures and modifications. The basic
pattern in this figure is that delinquencies were quite severe, and tended to result in
more foreclosures than modifications.
The total balance of loans in the sample peaked in 2007 at nearly $450 billion,
before rapidly declining due to poor performance. From 2009-2011, the delinquent
balance was roughly the same or slightly greater than the current balance. The
delinquent balance in these years ranged between $140-$155 billion. The delinquent
balance remained between 85%-65% of the current balance in the remaining years of
the sample.
The figure also shows the distribution of delinquency actions between foreclosures
and modifications. The height of the delinquent balance shows the total delinquent
balance, while the area of foreclosed and modified balances shows what portion of
delinquency actions they account for respectively. In all years, the foreclosed balance
was larger than the modified balance. The modified balance peaked at $31 billion in
2010, which was 86% of the foreclosed balance. The modified balance ranged between
50%-60% percent of the foreclosed balance in 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2014, but was
only 36% of the foreclosed balance from 2012-2013. In addition, typically between
40%-60% of delinquent loans were neither modified nor foreclosed.
2.3.2 Main Results
This section presents the main results for the increase in borrower debt balances
in loan modifications from 2008-2014. The presentation of the results begins by de-
4The full 2006-2014 period is shown here, rather than the 2008-2014 period which forms the basis
for the bulk of the analysis in the next section, to allow the reader to see the pre-crisis period of
2006.
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scribing the total increase in debt for the entire sample period, and total increases per
year. The section then provides greater detail for these aggregate findings by using
the restricted sample to analyze average increase in debt per modification. This por-
tion also discusses results for whether capitalization in modifications is driven by fees
or missed interest payments, and the servicers who are responsible for modifications
which reduce debt.
Table 2.2. Total Losses to Foreclosure and Change in Debt Balance for Sample,
CCF, and Market 2008-2014
Panel A: Total Number of Foreclosures and Modifications
Sample CCF PLS Market
Foreclosures 847,109 1,707,782 4,868,735
All Modifications 513,954 908,486 2,590,405
Redistribution Modifications 328,437 565,022 1,644,977
Type of Redistribution
Capitalization 304,448 517,552 1,506,732
Forgiveness 67,673 123,099 357,712
Type of Forgiveness
Principal 27,630 52,817 155,164
Interest 58,526 104,897 304,437
Expense 25,778 46,870 137,446
Panel B: Total Loss to Foreclosures and Change in Debt Balance from Modifications
Sample (Millions $) CCF (Billions $) PLS Market (Billions $)
Loss to Foreclosures 121,458 209.9 599.8
Redistribution Modifications
Capitalization 7,143 11.4 34.0
Forgiveness -2,957 -4.7 -14.2
Net 4,186 6.7 19.8
Type of Forgiveness
Principal 2,096 3.33 9.92
Interest 545.2 .89 2.66
Expense 316.3 .52 1.58
Table 2.2 presents the main results for total changes in debt balance due to mod-
ifications, and total losses to foreclosure from 2008-2014. The results are reported for
the restricted sample, and the full CCF. The results from the full CCF are then pro-
jected to the level of the entire PLS market based on the CCF's yearly market share.
Panel A presents the cumulative total number of modifications and foreclosures for
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the sample and the market. The basic patterns in this panel are that the cumulative
total number of modifications with capitalization far outpaced those with forgiveness,
and that foreclosures substantially outpaced modifications. For the restricted sample,
the total number of modifications with forgiveness was only slightly greater than 20%
of the number of modifications with capitalization. There were also almost 75% more
foreclosures than modifications in the restricted sample, and 88% more foreclosures
than modifications in the full CCF.
At the level of the entire PLS market, the results imply that there were slightly
under 5 million foreclosures. Compared with Corelogic's estimate of 5.7 million total
foreclosures since 2008 this figure is unexpectedly high, even when considering that the
PLS market accounted for the lion's share of foreclosures during the Great Recession
and weak recovery.5 However, the variable which measures foreclosures in the CCF
includes home forfeiture actions more broadly, rather than just narrow foreclosures.
This factor can likely account for the difference in estimates.
Panel B presents the main results for total change in debt balances and losses to
foreclosure. This panel presents the primary finding of the paper - that modifications
in the PLS market resulted in a cumulative net increase of borrower debt balances
by roughly $20 billion dollars from 2008-2014.6 The total amount capitalized in
modifications in this market was $34 billion, which was over twice as much as the
total amount forgiven of $14.2 billion. The panel also shows that losses to foreclosure
were significantly larger than total forgiveness. Roughly $120 billion was lost to
foreclosure in the sample, and $210 billion in the full CCF, from 2008-2014. At the
level of the entire market, this implies that total losses to foreclosure for this period
5Corelogic is a leading data provider which constructs widely used foreclosure reports.
The reports can be found here: http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/researchtrends/
national-foreclosure-report.aspx?WT.mc_id=prnw_160510_IrWNB#.V1dDVJErKhc.
6As described in the data description section, November 2008 is the first month for which the
CCF recorded different measures of redistribution in modifications. This makes 2009 the first year
for which we have complete data for redistribution in modifications.
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Figure 2.3. Net Change in Debt Balance from Modifications
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were almost $600 billion. This level of loss is equal to 22% of the December 2007 peak
outstanding balance for the entire PLS market of $2.7 trillion. The large amount of
losses to foreclosure relative to total debt forgiven suggests that substantially more
forgiveness could have occurred to prevent losses to foreclosure.
The remainder of the results in this section are all based on the restricted sample.
Figure 2.3 presents greater detail for the results in Table 2.2 by showing the total net
change in debt balances from modifications per year. The main finding in this figure
is that there was a larger increase in debt balances in 2014 than in any other year,
with the exception of the peak crisis year of 2010. This findng extends the existing
literature, because it shows that the increase in debt identified in COP (2010) and
White (2008) became larger through time. The peak year for total increase in debt
balances was 2010, where roughly $1.3 billion was added to borrower debt balances.
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Figure 2.4. Total Forgiveness and Capitalization in Modifications
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Over the course of the next two years, the total amount added to debt balances due
to modifications decreased. The lowest total amount added to debt balances occurred
in 2012, when debt balances were only increased by $288 million. However, following
2012 the total amount added to debt balances grew each year. In the final year of
the sample, modifications added $834 million to borrower debt balances.
Figure 2.4 presents total forgiveness and capitalization per year. This figure helps
to show whether changes in the total net increase in debt balances presented in Figure
2.3 were driven by forgiveness or capitalization. Variation in the total net change in
borrower debt balances seems to be driven more by variation in forgiveness than
capitalization. Total amounts capitalized peaked at over $1.5 billion in 2010, and
then remained fairly consistent at slightly over $1 billion per year for the remainder
of the sample period. In contrast, total forgiveness was quite low until 2011, when it
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Figure 2.5. Total Losses to Foreclosure and Forgiveness in Modifications
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reached roughly $500 million. Total forgiveness peaked in 2012 at almost $800 million,
before returning to pre-2011 levels in 2014. The total amount of capitalization was
relatively constant from 2011-2014, so variation in total net change in debt balances
was driven largely by the increase and decrease in total forgiveness. A probable
explanation for this pattern is that 2012 was the final year of the primary portion
of the HAMP program. To be sure, HAMP was extended beyond 2012. However
HAMP modifications accounted for a much smaller portion of total modifications in
the PLS market after 2012.7 As the HAMP program wound down, the results suggest
that forgiveness in modifications also decreased.
7For reference, see the quarterly OCC Mortgage Metrics reports from 2013-2014.
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Figure 2.5 compares total losses to foreclosure with the total amount of forgiveness
per year. The total amount of forgiveness here is gross forgiveness, not net, because
modifications resulted in net increases in debt balances in every year. The basic pat-
tern shown in this figure is that losses to foreclosure were several orders of magnitude
larger than gross forgiveness, which suggests that there was ample room for increas-
ing forgiveness. Indeed, losses to foreclosure per year in the sample are most usefully
measured in the tens of billions of dollars, while total forgiveness is more usefully
measured in the hundreds of millions. Losses to foreclosure peaked at close to $30
billion in 2009, and remained close to $20 billion for the next 3 years. In contrast,
gross forgiveness was not larger than $800 million in any year. At $30 billion, losses
to foreclosure in the peak year were roughly ten times larger than the combined total
forgiveness for all years in the sample, which was just under $3 billion. Considering
the large losses to foreclosure, forgiveness could have been far more generous.
Table 2.3 helps to provide more detail for the cumulative totals shown in Table 2.2
by reporting the total number of modifications and foreclosures, and mean change in
debt balance due to modifications, per year from 2008-2014. Panel A provides counts
of modifications, types of modifications, and foreclosures per year. The total number
of modifications are reported, as well as the number of modifications that resulted in
some change in borrower debt balances. Panel A also reports whether the modification
included capitalization or forgiveness, and type of forgiveness. The difference between
all modifications and redistribution modifications are the modifications which did not
result in net change debt balances. It is likely that these modifications only included
repayment plans. November 2008 was the first month in which information for redis-
tribution in modification was recorded in the CCF, which explains why redistribution
modifications was so low in 2008. Many modifications included some combination of
both capitalization and forgiveness.
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Table 2.3. Total Number of Modifications, Foreclosures, and Mean Change in Debt
Balance
Panel A: Total Number of Modifications and Foreclosures ($)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Foreclosures 140,008 180,000 128,905 121,257 115,679 106,803 54,457
All Mods 83,061 104,933 110,581 74,878 51,261 46,873 35,569
Redistribution Mods 9,446 57,893 82,891 59,104 44,653 41,966 32,484
Type of Redistribution
Capitalization 8,443 54,543 80,320 53,130 38,753 38,169 31,090
Forgiveness 2,428 12,943 10,975 14,565 13,252 8,790 4,720
Type of Forgiveness
Principal 902 3,366 2,852 6,197 7,113 5,219 1,981
Interest 2,036 11,405 9,691 13,129 11,511 6,772 3,982
Expense 1,132 3,335 2,578 6,448 6,703 3,856 1,726
Panel B: Mean Loss to Foreclosuse and Change in Debt Balance ($)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Loss to Foreclosure 111,388 162,243 154,099 153,911 158,793 127,582 122,528
Redistribution Modifications
Capitalization 12,219 13,268 19,743 23,386 28,038 33,396 36,232
Forgiveness 24,758 20,832 23,849 39,296 60,264 79,934 61,921
Net -4,558 -7,843 -15,973 -11,339 -6,449 -13,632 -25,680
Type of Forgiveness
Principal 46,182 55,257 66,917 71,332 80,412 95,142 84,191
Interest 6,729 5,917 5,454 6,578 12,079 17,109 17,542
Expense 4,201 4,842 6,997 6,813 13,071 23,395 32,231
Panel C: Mean Loss to Foreclosure and Change in Debt Balance (%)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Loss to Foreclosure 46.3 61.6 57.0 57.3 57.6 45.1 46.5
Redistribution Modifications
Capitalization 5.6 5.7 7.1 9.2 13.0 14.7 14.6
Forgiveness 13.6 9.0 10.1 16.4 21.9 25.2 18.3
Net -1.5 -3.3 -5.6 -4.6 -5.1 -8.1 -11.3
Type of Forgiveness
Principal 26.3 25.1 31.4 35.1 35.5 37.1 32.0
Interest 3.5 2.8 2.5 4.1 7.0 8.2 7.1
Expense 2.5 2.6 4.0 5.1 8.4 11.7 14.1
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There are three basic patterns in Panel A. First, most modifications increased
debt through capitalization. In contrast, modifications which included any form of
forgiveness were quite rare. The ratio of modifications which included capitalization
to those which included forgiveness ranged from roughly a high of 8:1 to a low of 3:1.
Even in the years in which forgiveness was most common relative to capitalization,
three times as much capitalization occurred. The second basic pattern is that forgive-
ness tended to occur through forgiveness of interest, but not principal or expenses. In
the peak crisis years of 2009-2010, interest forgiveness occurred almost twice as often
as the combined total of expense and principal forgiveness. Finally, the third basic
pattern is that foreclosures outpaced modifications in all years, which can also be seen
in Figure 2.2. The biggest difference between foreclosures and modifications occurred
in 2012-2013, when there were over twice as many foreclosures as modifications.
Panels B and C show the mean loss to foreclosure and change in debt balances
in dollars and as a percentage. These panels also show three basic patterns. First,
foreclosures were extremely costly. The average loss to foreclosure ranged between
roughly $110,000-$160,000, which was between 45%-62% of the original balance of
the loan. The large costs to foreclosure suggest that there was ample room for more
forgiveness to reduce loss severity. Second, principal forgiveness was much more
generous than any other form of forgivness, for the few loans that received it. Principal
forgiveness was over 30% of the current loan balance from 2010-2014, and peaked at
almost $100,000 in 2013. However, even at its peak, principal forgiveness per loan
was still less than the lowest amount of losses to foreclosure per loan. This suggests
that losses to foreclosure were high enough to create substantial room for much more
widespread principal forgiveness.
The third basic pattern, which is also the second primary finding of this paper, is
that the average net increase in debt balance per modification grew from 2008-2014.
The average net increase in debt balances per modification was only 1.3% in 2008, but
73
grew substantially to 11.3% in 2014. Average capitalization and forgiveness per loan
both grew throughout the sample period. However, forgiveness was far less common as
only 5% of total modifications resulted in net forgiveness. Therefore, the net increase
in loan balances grew through time. Average capitalization per loan roughly tripled
throughout the sample period, from $12,000 in 2008 to $36,000 in 2014. This increase
was from roughly 5.5% to 15% of the current loan balance. Average forgiveness per
loan also increased substantially during the sample period, peaking in 2013 at close to
$80,000 or 25% of the loan balance. Average forgiveness tended to be far larger than
average capitalization, however far fewer loans received forgiveness. Therefore the
average net change in debt balance was substantially negative in all years. Reflecting
the increase in capitalization, the net increase in loan balance was largest in the final
two years of the sample at between 8%-11% of loan balance, or $13,000-$25,000.
The third pattern in this table also extends the earlier findings of COP (2010)
and White (2008) by showing that the problems they identified grew worse through
time. Consistent with COP (2010) and White (2008), only 5% of total modifications
in my sample reduced borrower debt balances, and 2010 modifications increased debt
balances by roughly 5%. However, by the final year of the sample, modifications
increased borrower debt balances by an average of 11.3%, which is twice as large as
found in COP (2010) and White (2008).
The final primary finding of this paper is that the increase in average net debt
added per modification from 2010-2014 identified in Table 2.3 is consistent with
agency problems associated with servicers cost-plus compensation structure, because
the increase cannot be explained by a greater severity of delinquency in the later
years. Table 2.4 below provides results supporting this interpretation by presenting
mean amount of capitalization per delinquency, as well as average delinquencies for
all modifications, modifications with high amounts of capitalization, and modifica-
tions with low amounts of capitalization. High and low amounts of capitalization are
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defined as modifications in the highest and lowest quartiles of capitalization amounts
as a share of the outstanding loan balance.8 The main finding in this table is that
average capitalization per delinquency in modifications grew through time. This pat-
tern is consistent with larger fees imposed by servicers, but not a greater number of
missed interest payments.
Table 2.4. Mean Capitalization Per Delinquency
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Capitalization/Delinquency ($) 950.6 1,291 1,761 1,912 2,472 2,995 3,488
Mean Delinquency Per Modification
Low Capitalization 4.1 4.3 6.4 6.6 6.3 6.6 6.3
All Modifications 5.0 5.6 8.1 8.3 8.1 8.6 8.6
High Capitalization 10.4 10.3 10.8 10.7 10.5 10.6 10.4
In Table 2.4, average delinquency per modified loan remained constant from 2010-
2014, at close to 8 delinquencies during the previous year. Therefore, the average
number of missed interest payments per loan modification was constant during these
years. The average modification had 8 missed interest payments. This pattern is
consistent if we divide modifications into high and low capitalization modifications.
The average number of delinquencies per high and low capitalization modifications
were also constant from 2010-2014, at 6 and 10 delinquencies respectively.
This finding implies that variation in the number of delinquencies can explain
some of the cross-sectional variation in total amount capitalized per loan in a given
year, but not time-series variation in the increase in capitalization per modification
from 2008-2014. Therefore the mean amount capitalized per delinquency increased
substantially through time. Mean capitalization per delinquency more than tripled
during the sample period, growing from $950.60 in 2008 to $3,488 in 2014. The finding
8The lowest capitalization quartile is modifications which resulted in capitalization less than or
equal to 3.2% of the outstanding balance of the loan. The highest quartile includes modifications
that resulted in capitalization greater than or equal to 11.5% of the outstanding balance of the loan.
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of increased capitalization per delinquency is consistent with reports that many of
these modifications were designed to redefault to allow servicers to gain lucrative
foreclosure fees (Thompson, 2011; COP, 2009). This interpretation is also consistent
with the high redefault rate for the last three years of the sample, where over half
of the modifications redefaulted within the first year. Increased fee revenue in later
years is also consistent with the winding down of the HAMP program, because the
HAMP program prohibited the capitalization of late fees.9
The finding that the increased capitalization in later years represents increased fees
charged by servicers, but not increased missed interest payments, also implies that
a large portion of the increase in debt balances can be unambiguously interpreted
as increasing total debt obligations for the borrower. As discussed in the literature
review, whether capitalizing missed interest payments should be interpreted as in-
creasing total borrower debt obligations is ambiguous. However, this issue does not
affect the interpretation of the findings in this paper, because the increases in capital-
ization amounts are driven by increases in servicer fees, not missed interest payments.
Therefore, a large portion of the increase in debt balances found in this paper can
be unambiguously interpreted as increasing total borrower debt obligations through
punitive fees.
Overall, roughly 75% of these modifications did reduce borrower monthly pay-
ments and so provided some relief, even if increasing total borrower debt obligations.
However, increasing debt balances still had negative effects because it reduced the
stimulative power of debt restructuring. Even more significant considering the high
redefault rate is that increasing the borrowers negative equity guaranteed that re-
9The HAMP program prohibited the capitalization of late fees, but not all fees. The HAMP
program allowed servicers to capitalize advances made to third parties. However, many of the third
parties were in fact affiliated with the servicer, and servicers often received a percentage of the
advances made to these affiliates (Thompson, 2011). This practice was one practice which formed
the basis for CFPB enforcement actions, such as the one concerning Ocwen described below.
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defaults would result in costly foreclosure. Had sufficient principal been forgiven to
eliminate negative equity, the borrower would have been able to sell the home and
avoid foreclosure if they were still unable to remain current on their mortgage after
modification. Avoiding these foreclosures would have avoided unnecessary destruction
of wealth for borrowers, lenders, and the neighborhoods in which these foreclosures
occurred.
A final finding is that the modifications which reduced borrower indebtedness were
tightly limited to a small subset of servicers. Just three servicers account for over
80% of modifications which reduced borrower debt balances: Ocwen (61%), Litton
(13%), and Bank of America (7.5%). Of these, Ocwen alone accounts for over half
of modifications that resulted in net debt forgiveness. Ocwen also engaged in more
modification activity than other servicers. Ocwen serviced just 12% of total loans
and 14% of delinquent loans, but provided 25% of modifications. Ocwen is one of
the largest mortgage servicing companies in the country. It was the fourth largest in
2010, before a series of acquisitions made it the largest single servicer in 2013. One
of these acquisitions was Litton in 2011, and so Ocwen accounts for an even larger
share of modifications that reduced debt.10
That Ocwen accounted for such a large portion of modifications which reduced
debt is somewhat surprising because of Ocwen's documented history of consumer
protection abuses in loan servicing. The largest single complaint against Ocwen was
issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and attorney gener-
als from 49 states, and settled for $2 billion in December 2013. CFPB director,
Richard Cordray, stated that, Ocwen took advantage of borrowers at every stage
of the process. The complaint documented that Ocwen took advantage of home-
10Further details about the purchase of Litton can be found
here: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-06-06/
goldman-sachs-agrees-to-sell-litton-unit-to-ocwen-for-264-million-in-cash Accessed
June 7th, 2016.
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owners with servicing shortcuts and unauthorized fees, deceived consumers about
foreclosure alternatives and improperly denied loan modifications, and engaged in
illegal foreclosure practices.11 While it was surprising that Ocwen accounted for a
large portion of the loan modifications that reduced debt, the findings in this dataset
are also consistent with these consumer protection complaints. Ocwen also accounted
for a large proportion of the modifications that increased debt the most, and these
modifications were far more frequent than those that reduced debt. Ocwen accounted
for 35% of modifications in the top 25th percentile of the largest increase in borrower
debt balances. Wells Fargo was the only other servicer which accounted for over 10%
of modifications with high increases in debt balances, at 12%.
2.4 Conclusion
The primary results in this paper show that voluntary household debt restructur-
ing through loan modifications in the PLS market increased borrower debt balances
rather than reduced them. From 2008-2014, loan modifications added $20 billion to
borrower debt balances. The net increase in debt per modifications also grew larger
through time, roughly doubling from 2010-2014. This resulted in the net increase in
debt in 2014 being larger than in any other year of the sample, with the exception of
the peak crisis year of 2010, despite having fewer modifications than other years. The
increase in net debt added per modification is also consistent with increased fees im-
posed by servicers, but not by increased numbers of missed interest payments, because
missed interest payments per modification remained constant from 2010-2014.
11A description of the complaint and settlement can be
found here: http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/
cfpb-state-authorities-order-ocwen-to-provide-2-billion-in-relief-to-homeowners-for-servicing-wrongs/
The full text of the settlement can be found here: http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_
cfpb_consent-order_ocwen.pdf Accessed June 6th, 2016.
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The results in this paper are also consistent with a principal-agent problem be-
tween servicers and investors, based on the perverse incentives in servicer's cost-plus
compensation structure. Servicers were incentivized to foreclose rather than modify,
or to provide unsustainable mortgages that increased borrowers debt. This market
failure resulted in the unnecessary destruction of wealth for borrowers, investors, and
the communities in which these foreclosures occurred. Better loss mitigation likely
would have prevented a significant portion of the 5 million foreclosures, which resulted
in $600 billion lost, in the PLS market from 2008-2014.
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CHAPTER 3
A NEW PUBLIC OPTION FOR HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL
SERVICES
The goal of this paper is to draw lessons from the history of housing finance
regulation in the U.S. to advance a new proposal for reform. This paper proposes
that the U.S. federal government should create a new public option in housing finance,
which includes two components. First, the government should create a public bank
which directly provides households with basic payment services, small dollar loans,
and mortgages. Second, the government should manage an online financial services
marketplace.
This paper proposes the creation of a new public option because it would pro-
vide the government with regulatory tools to prevent consumer protection abuses
based on asymmetric information, such as unstable mortgages that concentrate risk
on households, as well as increase access to financial services for those who currently
lack it. The direct provision of services would help to regulate by enforcing a quality
floor through competition from below, which would make risky terms in mortgages
uncompetitive. This would also give government the power to directly provide mort-
gages with stable terms, rather than relying on prohibiting mortgages with the most
risky terms. Managing an online financial services marketplace would also prevent
consumer protection abuses such as deceptive practices, hidden fees, or risky terms by
increasing transparency with consumer protection ratings, product standardization,
and consumer reviews. This would directly regulate products sold in the online pub-
lic market, but also indirectly regulate products sold in the broader private market
through competition.
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This new public option would build off of the strengths of the New Deal housing
finance regulatory structure, while addressing a key weakness that rendered this struc-
ture vulnerable to erosion through time. This proposal builds off of the strengths of
the New Deal regulatory structure which heavily relied on public options as a method
of regulation to prevent unstable mortgages and increase access to financial services.
The public option as a method of regulation is defined as the use of public institutions
to regulate the market through active participation and direct competition with pri-
vate intermediaries. The paper will describe how these public institutions were able
to increase access to financial services by transforming existing intermediaries into
the functional equivalent of a heavily regulated public utility whose mission was to
provide affordable mortgage credit to households in the communities it was located
in. This paper will also describe how these public institutions were able to address
the problem of unstable mortgages by setting the terms of how mortgages distributed
risk to protect borrowers. These institutions accomplished this by making mortgages
with stable terms more competitive than mortgages without these terms by provid-
ing these mortgages access to Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance and
secondary market liquidity. For example, the government insured credit risk in mort-
gages through the FHA. However, mortgages were only eligible for this insurance if
they had terms that shielded borrowers from risk such as long repayment terms, fixed
interest rates, and full amortization. Public institutions were thus able to indirectly
set the terms of mortgage origination in the primary market to protect borrowers by
limiting access to the services they provided in the insurance and secondary market
(Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
This paper also argues that the lack of a public option in the primary market was a
key weakness of the New Deal regulatory structure that rendered it vulnerable to ero-
sion through time. I argue this was a weakness because the effectiveness of indirectly
setting the terms of the primary market through limiting access to the insurance and
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secondary markets depended on narrowly restricting the activities of primary market
intermediaries through regulations from above. However, these restrictions were vul-
nerable to erosion. I will describe how these restrictions were vulnerable to erosion
through time because they were too rigid to adapt to adverse market conditions, such
as the high inflation and interest rates of the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s.
I will also describe how the declining effectiveness of the ability to regulate using
public options following deregulation in the 1980s allowed the reemergence of unsta-
ble mortgages which concentrated risk on households who lacked alternative sources
of stable mortgage credit. The resulting defaults in these mortgages contributed to
the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression. The proposal in this paper
describes how direct public participation in the primary market would provide tools
to prevent the reemergence of unstable mortgages and lack of access, resulting in a
regulatory structure that would be more resistant to erosion through time.
The proposal for a public bank in this paper is also related to, but distinct from,
proposals for postal banking from the United States Postal Service Office of the
Inspector General (USPS OIG) (USPS, 2015, 2014). The USPS OIG has proposed
that post offices provide basic financial services such as deposit, bill pay, check cashing,
and small loans to households that lack access to traditional financial services. The
lynchpin postal banking product would be a reloadable, pre-paid postal debit card.
The public bank in this paper would also provide these basic services. However,
there are several key differences. First, it would provide a much wider range of
services such as mortgages, and possibly any other government guaranteed loan such
as Small Business Administration (SBA) loans. Second, I argue that the public
bank should directly compete with private institutions as a method to regulate them.
Finally, another key difference is that I propose that this bank be constituted as
an independent agency with independent finances from the USPS. The main role of
this agency would be to improve the function of regulation, rather than to provide
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revenue for the USPS. That being said, I think it would still be advisable to work
with the USPS to take advantage of its large geographic post office branch network.
This public bank could also generate revenue for the USPS, by renting space in postal
branches and providing services for the USPS to sell. However, revenue generation
would not be its primary function.
The remainder of this paper is organized into three sections. Section 1 describes
the New Deal solution to lack of access and unstable mortgage structures through the
creation of public options in housing finance. Section 2 describes weaknesses in the
New Deal regulatory structure which rendered it vulnerable to erosion through time.
The final section describes the details of the proposal for a new public option.
3.1 New Deal Solutions for Unstable Housing Finance
The purpose of this section is to describe how the New Deal reforms addressed the
housing finance problems of unstable mortgage structures and lack of access through
the creation of public options. To do so, this section begins by describing unstable
mortgages and lack of access in the pre-New Deal era. The section then describes
how the New Deal interventions during the Great Depression created a diverse ar-
ray of public institutions that actively participated in the market. This section will
describe how these institutions improved access to mortgage credit through trans-
forming depository institutions, particularly thrifts, into the functional equivalent
of a heavily regulated public utility that would provide affordable mortgage credit
to households. The section then describes how the Homeowner Loan Corporation
(HOLC) created stable mortgages that shielded borrowers from risk through the ne-
cessity of restructuring the existing unstable mortgages that had defaulted. These
new stable mortgages also improved access by including terms, such as longer terms
and higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, that made them affordable to a larger share
of households. Finally, the section will also describe how the government was able to
83
indirectly regulate the terms of mortgage origination in the primary market through
limiting access to FHA insurance and the secondary market.
3.1.1 Lack of Access and Unstable Mortgages in pre-New Deal Housing
Finance
Lack of access to basic financial services for low to moderate income classes was a
persistent feature of unregulated U.S. financial markets before the New Deal. Prior
to the New Deal era, roughly one-third of counties lacked access to a provider of
mortgage credit (FHLBB, 1983). Additionally, a large portion of families could not
access mortgage credit due to the terms of the mortgages. Maximum LTV ratios were
typically capped at 50 percent. Therefore, a family would require a 50 percent down
payment to obtain a mortgage. Lack of access contributed to the homeownership rate
being much lower than modern levels. The homeownership rate at the turn of the
century was roughly 40 percent, compared to modern levels of between 60-70 percent
in the latter portion of the twentieth century (Snowden, 2009).
Expansion of access to financial services was a central demand in widespread calls
for reform from historical social movements such as the populists in the late 19th cen-
tury, the progressives in the early 20th century, and the labor movement throughout
this period. Widespread lack of access was also a main driving force behind early
proposals for postal banking in the U.S. and Europe. These calls advocated for the
post office to provide safe deposit services and credit to households who lacked access.
For example, the Populist Party's 1892 platform stated that, We demand that postal
savings banks be established by the government for the safe deposit of the earnings
of the people and to facilitate exchange, (Baradaran, 2015).
When households were able to access mortgage credit in the pre-New Deal era,
the structure of mortgages was unstable because it concentrated risk on households.
These loans typically had terms of 3-5 years, but were not fully-amortizing. They
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were named bullet mortgages because they required a large bullet payment at
the end the loan term. Borrowers typically depended on the extension of a new
mortgage at the end of the loan to prevent foreclosure (Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
This structure concentrated interest rate, liquidity, and market risk on households.
These mortgages concentrated interest rate risk on households because if interest
rates increased during the loan term, households would only be able to obtain a new
mortgage at the higher interest rate. These mortgages concentrated liquidity risk on
households because households had to bear the risk that a new mortgage would not
be available at the end of the loan term. Finally, the households had to bear market
risk also, because they would bear the first losses if the value of their home declined.
Bullet loans are also consistent with what Hyman Minsky described as financially
fragile ponzi or speculative structures (Minsky, 2008). These structures are fragile
because of the dependence on external finance for solvency. Minsky provided a three-
part taxonomy of hedge, speculative, and ponzi financial positions. This taxonomy
is based on the relation between the operating income and debt service payments
of borrowers. A firm or household is in a hedge financial position when the antici-
pated operating income is sufficient to cover both interest payments and scheduled
reductions in indebtedness. A firm or household is in a speculative position when
anticipated operating income is sufficient to cover interest payments, but not suffi-
cient to cover the amounts due on maturing loans. This is more fragile than a hedge
position because the agent must rely on external financing, for example in the form of
new loans, to repay part or all of the amount due on maturing loans. Finally, a firm
or household is in a ponzi position when anticipated operating income is insufficient
to even cover interest payments. This is the most fragile position because the firm
must rely on external financing to even meet interest commitments (Kindleberger,
1978).
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3.1.2 New Deal Crisis Intervention and the Creation of Public Options
The unstable mortgages described in the previous section experienced a large wave
of defaults during the Great Depression. From 1931-1935, there were roughly 250,000
foreclosures per year (Green and Wachter, 2005). At the height of the Depression in
1933, roughly half of homes were in default, and 10 percent of homes in foreclosure
(Levitin and Wachter, 2013). These defaults were particularly onerous for savings and
loans (S&Ls) institutions, because their portfolio was highly concentrated in mort-
gages. From 1930-1934, the foreclosure rate on mortgages, measured as a share of the
total dollar value of loans outstanding, was approximately 14 percent. This caused
the failure of a large portion of S&Ls. From 1931-1933, the size of the S&L indus-
try contracted by 25 percent. The industry contracted another 15 percent between
1933-1939 (FHLBB, 1983). The large number of foreclosures and failing financial
institutions prompted widespread calls for government intervention.
Levitin andWachter, who are legal historians of housing finance regulation, present
a detailed case study of how the use of public options as regulatory tools in housing fi-
nance emerged in an ad hoc manner to respond to the crisis of the Great Depression.
The description of the use of public options in this section will draw heavily from
their account, and focus on how public options were used to address the problems of
lack of access and unstable mortgages. They define the public option as a mode of
regulation as the use of public institutions to regulate the market through competing
with private institutions and directly providing goods and services. The remainder of
this section will describe how public options in housing finance regulated the market
in two ways. First, they provided services to private intermediaries, but used the pro-
vision of these services to regulate the private intermediaries. For example, the FHA
provided a service to intermediaries by insuring credit risk on mortgages. However,
the FHA used this insurance as a regulatory tool by limiting access to insurance to
mortgages with stable terms. Second, public institutions, in particular the HOLC,
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used the direct provision of services to household to also create durable trends which
set the terms of the market. For example, the HOLC set the terms of how mortgages
distributed risk to shield borrowers by creating the fixed interest rate, long repayment
term, fully amortizing mortgage (Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
The creation of public institutions was initially intended to serve as temporary
stop-gap measures until private financial markets could be revived. However, these
institutions ended up operating far longer than was anticipated. The creation of
these public institutions occurred in two waves. First, the government created the
Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system, the Federal Savings and Loans Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). When
these proved insufficient to revive the market on their own, the government then
created the second group of institutions, which include the HOLC, FHA insurance,
and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). In the remainder of
this section, I will describe in more detail how these institutions solved the problems
of lack of access and unstable mortgages (Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
3.1.2.1 The FHLBs, FSLIC, and FDIC
The first set of institutions created was the FHLBs, FDIC, and FSLIC. These ini-
tial institutions helped to improve access to financial services through transforming
depository institutions, particularly thrifts, into the functional equivalent of a heavily
regulated public utility for providing mortgage credit. The New Deal reforms estab-
lished the FHLBs, which were modeled after the Federal Reserve system and governed
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The FHLBB was given the power
to charter federal savings and loans associations. These charters granted S&Ls ac-
cess to services that stabilized their funding, such as liquidity provided by the FHLB
system through discounting mortgages, and deposit insurance through the FSLIC.
However, these charters also served a regulatory function by restructuring existing
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S&Ls into a specialized intermediary for providing mortgage credit through imposing
substantial restrictions on permissible activities and portfolio strategies. These in-
cluded restrictions on lines of business, branching, types of assets that could be held
and in what amounts, lending beyond a specified distance from the thrift institution,
the amount of loan that could be lent to a single entity, and prohibited adjustable rate
lending. Essentially, these restrictions created a narrow business model where thrifts
would originate mortgages and hold them in their portfolio (Levitin and Wachter,
2013; D'Arista, 1994).
The New Deal reforms essentially envisioned the role of thrifts as similar to a heav-
ily regulated public utility whose public mission was to provide access to affordable
mortgage credit for the communities in which they were located. These public utilities
were also designed to provide fair access to affordable credit for all communities, at
all income levels. The branching restrictions, geographic restrictions on lending, and
restrictions on interstate banking can be understood in this context. These restric-
tions were put in place due to fears that interstate branch banking would undermine
fair access to credit by channeling deposits out of low-income rural communities and
into financial centers such as New York (D'Arista, 1994).
The FDIC also provided commercial banks deposit insurance which helped sta-
bilize their funding. However, deposit insurance was also used as a regulatory tool
to promote the reduce risk at commercial banks. For example, acces to deposit
insurance required commerical banks to submit to direct monitoring through bank
examinations. This were necessary to prevent moral hazard due to deposit insurance.
While depository insurance stabilized deposits, it also removed the market incentive
for depositors to monitor the risk activities of insured institutions. Therefore, the
FDIC needed to directly monitor risk (Levitin and Wachter, 2013; D'Arista, 1994).
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3.1.2.2 The HOLC
The creation of stable mortgage structures occurred through the need to address
the large number of foreclosures caused by the existing unstable mortgage structures.
As described above, at the height of the Great Depression in 1933, roughly one-half
of the mortgages in the country were in default, and 10 percent were in foreclosure.
To address this crisis, the federal government directly entered into the mortgage
market through the creation of the HOLC. The HOLC bought up defaulted mortgages
and restructured them into more stable mortgages on a large scale. The new stable
mortgage terms pioneered by the HOLC included fixed-interest rates, long payment
terms, and full amortization. In its first year, the HOLC received applications from
40 percent of all mortgage holders, and refinanced half of them. After the HOLC's
first year, the federal government was the country's largest single mortgagor, holding
and servicing slightly over 10 percent of all residential mortgages in the country.
The program was also quite successful at crisis mitigation, preventing default and
foreclosure by significantly lowering monthly payments for borrowers. Additionally,
lenders were happy to receive much needed liquidity and to remove non-performing
loans from their balance sheets (Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
The significance of the HOLC for the public option is that it showcased the power
of the government to use the direct provision of services to households in the primary
market to shield borrowers from risk. In setting the new terms of the mortgages to
improve stability, the government needed to redistribute the bundle of risks inherent to
the structure of mortgages. The new mortgages were stable because they redistributed
liquidity and interest risk away from households and towards financial intermediaries,
who more robust tools to manage these risks. For example, the long-term, fully-
amortizing structure removed liquidity risk from households because it did not require
the extension of a new mortgage at the end of the loan term. Financial intermediaries
would now have to bear greater liquidity risk than under the older mortgage structure
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with a 3-5 year term. However, they would also have more tools to manage this risk
than households, because they had access to liquidity from the FHLBs and Federal
Reserve, as well as deposit insurance. Additionally, the fixed-rate shielded households
from interest rate risk, leaving them with stable monthly payments they could budget
around. However, depository institutions would now have to bear this risk. As will
be described below, the tools they had to bear this risk were insufficient to deal with
the high inflation and interest rates of the late 1960s and 1970s. It was only with the
growth of securitization in the 1990s that they would have adequate tools to manage
interest rate risk. Finally, the new mortgage structure did not shield households from
market risk, because they still bore first losses from house price declines (Levitin and
Wachter, 2013; D'Arista, 1994; Mian and Sufi, 2014).
The new mortgages were also more accessible due to the long-terms and higher
allowable LTV ratios. The long-terms lowered monthly payments to a level that was
affordable for a much larger share of households. Additionally, the higher allowable
LTVs of up to 80 percent, compared to the 33-50 percent before, made the mortgages
more accessible by lowering the required down payment. The HOLC also helped
this mortgage set the trend by proving the feasibility of this radical innovation on
a large scale, and then standardizing it. The HOLC standardized this mortgage by
creating a basic template for origination, servicing, and foreclosure, which allowed for
widespread adoption by private intermediaries. Standardization was also a necessary
condition for sale in the secondary market, because investors were typically unwilling
to assume the credit risk inherent in non-standard products (Levitin and Wachter,
2013).
3.1.2.3 FHA Insurance, Fannie Mae, and the Secondary Market
While the entrance of the HOLC into the mortgage market made the federal gov-
ernment the single largest mortgagor in the country, the federal government was not
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interested in actually holding these mortgages. The government was not interested
in managing the credit and interest rate risk in these mortgages, or having to con-
duct foreclosures on delinquent mortgages. Therefore, the government wanted to sell
these loans back to the private market. However, at this time there was no func-
tional secondary market for mortgages. Creating the secondary market required the
government to assume credit risk through FHA insurance, and to create Fannie Mae
to sell FHA insured loans in the secondary market. This was significant for regula-
tion because the provision of mortgage insurance and secondary market funding to
intermediaries was used as a tool to indirectly regulate the terms of mortgages in
the primary market, as will be described below. Additionally, it was also a necessary
condition for the widespread adoption of the new mortgage structure. (Levitin and
Wachter, 2013).
The government needed to assume credit risk to create the secondary market
because investors were still wary due to the Great Depression. FHA insurance ac-
complished this goal, but more significantly also served as a tool to regulate the
primary market. FHA insurance was able to indirectly set the terms of the primary
market by limiting access to mortgage insurance to loans that conformed to the new
structure created by the HOLC. Initially, the FHA required mortgages to have fixed
interest rates up to 5 percent, long terms up to 20 years, and LTVs up to 80 percent.
However, in 1937 this was increased to 30 year terms with LTVs as high as 97 percent
(Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
Limiting access to insurance to mortgages that met these stable terms served as a
tool to regulate mortgage terms in the primary market by making stable mortgages
more competitive. From the perspective of the intermediary, insured loans were more
desirable because they could be sold in the secondary market and hence had greater
liquidity. Insurance also indirectly regulated uninsured loans through competition by
creating a quality floor. Uninsured loans needed to have comparable terms to insured
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loans in order to be desirable to borrowers. Indirectly regulating the primary market
by limiting access to FHA insurance and the secondary market became one of the
main regulatory mechanisms of housing finance in the latter half of the twentieth
century (Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
Once the federal government had assumed credit risk through mortgage insurance,
the loans could then be sold back to private institutions through the secondary market.
However, the government needed an institution to manage the sales of loans and
securities on the secondary market. The government accomplished this by creating
Fannie Mae to purchase FHA insured loans, and sell long-term bonds based on the
underlying cash flows. Moreover, Fannie Mae was willing to purchase any government
insured loan at par, and so increased market liquidity for insured loans even when it
did not directly buy them. While the secondary mortgage market did not experience
rapid growth until the 1980s, it was still important in this time period because it
increased market liquidity. Moreover, the creation of the secondary market helped to
further cement the trend of the mortgage structure pioneered by the HOLC as the
dominant U.S. mortgage structure (Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
3.1.2.4 Successes and Limitations
While dating institutional systems is necessarily arbitrary to some degree, the
regulatory structure put in place by the New Deal reforms only fully solidified after
World War II with the Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951. Before this, public efforts were
either concentrated on direct crisis intervention in the depression, or on financing the
war.1 The public institutions that regulated intermediaries through providing them
services, such as liquidity and insurance, proved to be long-lasting. However, direct
public participation in the primary market was always seen as temporary. As the
1During the war, depository institutions were essentially turned into government bond holding
companies. However, this also had the effect of filling the financial system with safe, liquid assets
which reduced financial fragility (Minsky, 2008).
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HOLC wound down operations in 1951, so too did the government's participation in
the primary market. As the government retreated from direct provision of credit in
the primary market, it left the private intermediaries with stable mortgage products
to provide to households, as well as the robust secondary market infrastructure to
support these mortgages.
The regulatory structure for housing finance during this period was remarkably
successful at increasing homeownership and preventing financial crises. The institu-
tions specialized to solely provide mortgage credit, thrift institutions, grew rapidly
following World War II, with assets increasing 900 percent between 1945-1960. Thrifts
provided roughly half of mortgage credit during this time period, and commercial
banks also provided roughly one-third. Homeownership increased dramatically in the
postwar period. The homeownership rate was roughly 40 percent at the turn of the
century, and remained relatively constant until declining slightly during the Great
Depression. However, following the New Deal reforms and the end of World War II,
the homeownership rate increased from 44 percent in 1940 to over 65 percent in 1970.
Considering the previous unstable structure of housing finance, it is an impressive
accomplishment that this structure successfully provided stable household credit en
masse for the first time in U.S. history (Gale, Gruber and Stephens-Davidowitz, 2007;
Markham, 2002; FHLBB, 1983; Goldsmith, 1968).
However, the accomplishment of increasing homeownership during this period
was also incomplete and highly unequal due to pervasive racial discrimination. Most
notably, FHA housing policies such as redlining systematically prevented African-
Americans from receiving mortgage credit. This discrimination excluded African-
Americans from homeownership which was the primary channel for building wealth.
Moreover, African-Americans who did own homes were concentrated in neighbor-
hoods where home values were affected by the self-fulfilling prophecies of the FHA
appraisers. These areas were cut off from sources of new investment, which caused
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their house prices to lose value compared to white neighborhoods which FHA ap-
praisers deemed desirable. This systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the
primary wealth building channel for the middle class has featured prominently in re-
cent calls for reparations, such as that from Ta Nahisi-Coates (Coates, 2014; Gordon,
2005; Oliver and Shapiro, 1995).
The exclusion of African-Americans from stable mortgage credit also foreshadows
a problem that contributed to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Lack of access to
affordable financial services made African-Americans vulnerable to predatory lending
because of lack of alternatives. The dominant form of housing finance for African-
Americans during this period was buying on contract. The terms of this financial
arrangement would be that the buyer would make monthly payments directly to the
seller, with the promise that they would receive the deed only once the home was
entirely paid off. However, this financial arrangement gave African-Americans all the
risks of owning the home, with none of the benefits. African-Americans would be
responsible for all repairs to the home, similar to an owner. However, they would not
build equity in their home as the made payments, similar to a renter. Therefore, if
they fell behind on payments they would be evicted, with the seller keeping all the
equity in the home. This provided an incentive for sellers to design these contracts
to be unaffordable. To this end, sellers typically inflated home prices two to three
times the market rate, and included high interest rates to make monthly payments
unaffordable (Coates, 2014; Satter, 2010). As will be described in the next section,
lack of access making borrowers vulnerable to predatory lending was a problem which
contributed to the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
3.2 Weaknesses in the New Deal Regulatory Structure
The purpose of this section is to analyze the history of the housing finance regu-
latory structure, from 1951-2007. It identifies weaknesses which the proposal in this
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paper would provide tools to address. The primary historical argument developed
in this section is that a key weakness of the New Deal regulatory strategy was that
the ability of public options in the secondary and insurance markets to indirectly
set the terms of the primary market depended on narrowing the permissible actions
of primary market intermediaries through restrictions from above. However, these
restrictions were vulnerable to erosion through time. Essentially, the ability of public
institutions to use the provision of support to make stable mortgages more compet-
itive than alternatives depended on what alternatives were available. This historical
argument will be developed based on an analysis of two time periods, 1951-1979 and
1980-2007. The analysis of the first time period will describe the forces contributing
to the erosion of restrictions, eventually leading to deregulation in the early 1980s.
The analysis of the second time period will then describe how deregulation helped to
allow unstable mortgage structures reemerge and contribute to the largest financial
crisis since the Great Depression.
3.2.1 Regulatory Weaknesses Leading to Deregulation: 1951-1979
This section describes forces contributing to the erosion of the New Deal restric-
tions during the postwar period from 1951-1979, which resulted in deregulation in the
early 1980s. This section argues that the basic problem of this period was that the
New Deal restrictions were too rigid to adapt to the high inflation and interest rates
of the late 1960s and 1970s. The previous section described how New Deal restrictions
essentially created a narrow business model for depository institutions, particularly
thrifts, based on originating and holding long-term, fixed rate mortgages. However,
the viability of this business model depended on stable low inflation and interest
rates, and restricting competition over sources of funding for depository institutions.
This section describes how the changing economic environment in the late-1960s and
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throughout the 1970s undermined both of these conditions, leading to the removal of
restrictions through deregulation in the 1980s.
The New Deal restrictions essentially created a narrow business model for the
provision of long-term, fixed rate mortgages, where depository institutions would
originate these mortgages and hold them in their portfolio. Richard Kovacevich,
former CEO of Wells Fargo, reflected on this period as one in which the business of
banking was boring because, the government told banks what products they could
sell, what prices they could charge, and where they could do business. The relative
straightforwardness of the business model left to depository institutions has also been
described by the 3-6-3 rule. Banks borrowed money at the Regulation Q 3 percent
interest rate for deposits, and loaned money at 6 percent. They were then free to
play golf by 3 p.m because there was nothing left to do (Kovacevich, 2008; Markham,
2002).
Regulation Q interest rate caps were an important part of this stable business
model. Regulation Q prohibited the payment of interest on demand deposits, and
set a maximum rate on the amount of interest rate allowed for savings accounts.
Regulation Q was created as part of the New Deal reforms to restrict banks from
engaging in ruinous price competition. New Deal reforms saw aggressive bidding
for customers through offering higher interest rates on deposits as contributing to
the financial instability which caused the Great Depression. While inflation and
interest rates were low, Regulation Q contributed to stability by preventing this form
of competition. Additionally, the interest rate caps provided depository institations
a subsidy by allowing them to raise funds at below market rates (D'Arista, 1994).
Inflation remained low and stable until the mid-1960s. Inflation in 1964 averaged
1 percent per year. However, in the late 1960s inflation started increasing due to
spending on the Vietnam war. Inflation continued to rise throughout the 1970s as
well due to large increases in oil prices. By 1980, inflation had reached 14 percent per
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year (Bryan, 2013). This inflation caused problems for the originate and hold business
model because the value of the debt was set in nominal terms, and the interest rates
were fixed. As the price level rose, this caused the real value of these assets and the
income stream derived from them to depreciate.
The high inflation, in turn, led to increases in the nominal interest rates on gov-
ernment bonds. This posed an additional problem for depository institutions because
interest rates on government bonds increased beyond the maximum rate of interest
allowed to be paid on deposits under Regulation Q. This led to disintermediation,
as deposits moved to the money market where they could earn a higher interest rate
(Minsky, 2008; D'Arista, 1994; Wolfson, 1993).
Disintermediation in the 1970s was also facilitated by the development of close
substitutes for deposits. The ability of depository institutions to raise funds at be-
low market rates depended on these institutions having a monopoly on the provision
of deposit accounts. As long as there were no other providers of deposit accounts,
Regulation Q interest rate caps allowed them to raise funds for a lower cost. How-
ever, money market mutual funds (MMMFs) challenged this monopoly by providing
deposit-like services (Minsky, 2008; D'Arista, 1994; Wolfson, 1993).
MMMFs were mutual funds that pooled funds from investors, and invested them in
money market instruments. The liabilities of MMMFs were technically equity shares
in the overall mutual fund, and not deposits. These liabilities were not covered by de-
posit insurance, and could experience loss. However, they shared many features with
deposits that made them close substitutes. First, these liabilities were relatively safe
because they were invested in stable money market instruments, such as government
bonds. Second, they were easily withdrawn on demand. Some MMMFs even issued
limited check-writing capabilities. As market interest rates rose above Regulation Q
caps, MMMFs were able to offer a higher rate of return than depository institutions,
for liabilities that were functionally similar to deposits. As a result, depository in-
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stitutions experienced disintermediation as their deposits flowed to MMMFs. The
competitive inequity between depository institutions and MMMFs created incentives
for regulators to loosen restrictions to allow depository institutions to better com-
pete on a level playing field. To this end, commercial banks and thrifts developed
money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) and negotiable order of withdrawal ac-
counts (NOWs). These were similar in nature to MMMF shares, because they were
functionally demand deposits which were allowed to pay interest. These new innova-
tions were initially prohibited, but eventually allowed under deregulation in the 1980
Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) and 1982
Garn-St. Germain Act (Minsky, 2008; D'Arista, 1994; Wolfson, 1993).
To combat rising inflation in the 1970s, Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker signif-
icantly increased interest rates in what has since been named, the Volcker Shock.
In 1981, the effective federal funds rate peaked at just over 19 percent.2 The Vol-
cker shock effectively ended the viability of the originate and hold model because
depository institutions needed to pay a higher rate for their funding then they were
able to receive on their long-term fixed-rate assets. The increase in interest rates
was particularly onerous for the thrift industry, whose portfolios contained a higher
proportion of mortgages than commercial banks. By 1982, the entire thrift industry
was insolvent by roughly $150 billion (Black, 2013; Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
3.2.2 The Consequences of Deregulation: 1980-2007
This section discusses how the removal of restrictions on intermediaries following
deregulation weakened the ability of public institutions to indirectly regulate the pri-
mary market through participation in secondary and insurance markets. A complete
description of the effects of deregulation is beyond the scope of this essay. Instead,
2Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED Database. Accessed July 7th, 2016 from: https:
//fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS
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the discussion in this section will focus on the problems which the proposal in this
paper will provide tools to address. This section will describe how deregulation con-
tributed to: 1) The reemergence of unstable mortgage structures through innovations
that redistribute risk towards households, 2) Lack of access to affordable financial
services, and 3) Competition in laxity by regulators due to erosion of distinctions
between intermediaries.
As described in the previous section, the Volcker shock effectively ended the vi-
ability of the originate and hold business model for providing long-term fixed rate
mortgages. This exposed the limits of depository institution's ability to manage in-
terest rate risk, leading to widespread insolvency in the thrift industry. The resolution
of this crisis could have occurred through either allowing adjustable rate mortgages
(ARMs), or through securitization through the government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The eventual resolution of the crisis occurred
through securitization, which renewed the viability of long-term fixed-rate mortgages
by enabling the originate to distribute business model. Fannie and Freddie would also
regulate the terms of the primary market by setting the terms of access to the sec-
ondary market. However, this only occurred after deregulation removed restrictions
on depository institutions to allow them to experiment with adjustable-rate lending.
The removal of these restrictions would have wide-ranging effects that limited the
ability of Fannie and Freddie to set the terms of the primary market. These effects
will be described in detail below.
Deregulation occurred with the DIDMCA of 1980 and Garn-St. Germain Act of
1982. In addition to allowing adjustable-rate lending, these acts also abolished an
entire range of restrictions including those on interest rates, underwriting standards,
lines of business, concentration of ownership, size of loans that can be given to a sin-
gle borrower, and conflicts of interest. To be sure, Congress attempted to reimpose
restrictions through the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) in
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1994. This act prohibited certain predatory lending practices by regulating balloon
payments, negative-amortizing mortgages, and many other practices. The act addi-
tionally directed the Federal Reserve to prohibit acts which were deceptive, not in
the interest of the borrower, or designed to evade the act. However, under Chairman
Greenspan the Federal Reserve refused to engage in HOEPA rulemakings despite
pressure from consumer groups. Even worse, when states enacted their own HOEPA
like regulation, federal banking regulators such as the OCC pre-empted these laws
making them no longer binding. While the DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain Act
dismantled the federal regulatory structure, this preemption dismantled the remain-
ing state regulatory structure, leaving an essentially unregulated market (Taub, 2014;
Levitin and Wachter, 2013).
Deregulation allowed the rapid reemergence of mortgage structures that were un-
stable because they redistributed risk back towards households. As described in
section 1, when the HOLC created the fixed-rate, fully amortizing mortgage, it re-
distributed interest rate risk and liquidity risk away from households and towards
financial intermediaries. However, the general trend in mortgage innovations follow-
ing deregulation was to redistribute these risks back towards households. For example,
immediately following deregulation ARMs with initial teaser rates became available.
These loans contained a lower interest rate, and hence lower monthly payments, for
an initial teaser period. At the end of this period, the interest rate would reset at a
higher rate, resulting in higher payments. In addition to redistributing interest rate
risk back to households, this loan also redistributed liquidity and market risk towards
households. Households bore liquidity risk because these mortgages often required
refinancing at the expiration of the teaser period because the increased payments
were unaffordable. Additionally, market risk was already concentrated on households
under the terms of the traditional fixed-rate mortgage. Market risk also amplified
liquidity risk because if the value of the home declined sufficiently to cause negative
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equity for the borrower, the borrower would not be able to refinance the loan. The
concentration of interest, liquidity, and market risk on households was functionally
similar to the pre-New Deal bullet loans described in section 1 (Taub, 2014; Levitin
and Wachter, 2013; Peek, 1990).
Deregulation also increased lack of access to financial services for low and middle
income borrowers. Following deregulation in the 1980s, credit unions and thrift in-
stitutions ceased to play their traditional role of providing low-cost services to lower
and middle income households, in favor of adopting business models more similar
to commercial banks. Without the institutions that traditionally fulfilled this role,
a large fraction of the U.S. population is currently excluded from access to basic,
low-cost financial services (Baradaran, 2013).
In 2013, roughly 7.7 percent of U.S. households were unbanked, defined as lacking
access to a bank account. This includes roughly 9.6 million households, containing
16.7 million adults and 8.7 million children. However, this figure understates the
problem because a large portion of the population is underbanked. This is defined as
having a bank account, but still having to rely on high-cost, predatory financial ser-
vices like pay-day lenders. In 2013 there were an additional 20 percent of households
that were underbanked. This includes roughly 24.8 million households, containing
50.9 million adults, and 16.6 million children. In total, roughly 30 percent of U.S.
households are unbanked or underbanked, and thus are excluded from access to tradi-
tional financial services.3 Lack of access to traditional financial services makes these
households particularly vulnerable to high cost, predatory lending practices. For ex-
ample, the average payday loan contains a 400 percent interest rate, compared to
interest rates of between 12-30 percent for credit cards.4 Additionally, the average
3Source: 2013 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households. Accessed
7-13-2016 from: https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2013report.pdf
4Source: Consumer Finance Protection Bureau. Accessed July 7th from: http://www.
consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1567/what-payday-loan.html
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household that lacks access to traditional services spends almost 10 percent of its
income on fees for financial transactions. These fees totaled roughly $89 billion in
2012 alone (Baradaran, 2015; USPS, 2014).
Lack of access also made these borrowers vulnerable to mortgages that redis-
tributed risk towards them because they did not have an alternative source of stable,
affordable mortgage credit. In the period preceding the financial crisis, unstable mort-
gages concentrated risk on these borrowers. However, these borrowers were also the
least able to bear this risk because they were precisely those who had low income,
low assets, and lacked access to alternative financing. When house prices declined
enough to give these borrowers negative equity, these borrowers were not able to refi-
nance mortgages once the initial teaser periods expired. This caused a large number
of defaults which generated large macroeconomic externalities by contributing to the
financial crisis of 2007-2009 (Mian and Sufi, 2014).
The concentration of risk through unstable mortgage structures was facilitated by
the rapid growth of the market for private-label mortgage backed securities (PLS).
Under the previous originate and hold model for mortgages, borrower's and lender's
interest were aligned because concentrating risk on subprime borrowers would also
increase credit risk for the originating institution. Additionally, during the 1990s the
underwriting standards required to be eligible for securitization through the GSE's
helped to reestablish the traditional fixed-rate mortgage as the dominant mortgage
during the 1990s. However, the rapid growth of the PLS market from 2002-2006
allowed these risky mortgages to be securitized, hence removing the credit risk from
the originating institutions. This created an incentive structure where the incentives
of lender's were not aligned with those of borrowers. Instead, originating institutions
were incentivized to originate a larger volume of mortgages to gain more fee revenue,
without regard to the credit quality of mortgages being originated. The rise of the
PLS market thus weakened the ability of the GSE's to regulate the primary market
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through limiting access to the secondary market (Taub, 2014; Levitin and Wachter,
2013).
These private mortgage-backed securities could be sold to investors, who were only
interested in safe securities that did not bear credit risk, because the quality of the un-
derlying mortgages was grossly misrepresented. A recent body of economic research
has now extensively documented that investors in private MBS were systematically
defrauded and misled about the quality of the securities which they purchased. For
example, Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015) show that fraud was endemic to this
market because, a significant degree of misrepresentation exists across all reputable
intermediaries involved in the sale of mortgages, [emphasis in original]. A related
study by Griffin and Maturana (2016) confirms these findings be showing that ap-
proximately half of the loans used as collateral for MBS exhibited at least one of three
easy to measure indicators of fraud: appraisal value inflation, unreported second liens,
and misreported owner occupancy status. These findings should also be interpreted
as a conservative lower bound for the incidence of fraud because they do not measure
all types of fraud. In a recent ruling from a lawsuit concerning whether the quality
of mortgages used as collateral for MBS was accurately described or misrepresented,
District Judge Denise Cote stated that, The magnitude of falsity, conservatively
measured, is enormous.5
Deregulation also weakened the ability of regulators to prohibit these practices
directly because the erosion of distinctions between intermediaries allowed them to
switch their charters to be regulated by whoever would offer the least stringent re-
strictions. This produced an incentive for regulators to compete to offer the lowest
5From ruling in Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America, May 11th, 2015.
The FHFA sued 16 banks for misrepresentations made in offering documents and prospectuses for
securities sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. All but Nomura and Royal Bank Scotland settled
out of court, and the court ruled against these institutions in trial on May 11th, 2015. Accessed on
July 7th, 2016 from: https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2077713/
ruling-on-mortgage-fraud-in-2008-crisis.pdf
103
standards - competition in laxity. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) was likely
the most spectacular example of competition in laxity from the period leading to the
2007-2009 financial crisis. OTS funding was based on a levy on the amount of assets
under its supervision. The OTS therefore had an incentive to increase the amount of
assets under its regulation so that it could increase its funding. To do so, it offered
banks less stringent regulation, and provided regulatory cover for institutions respon-
sible for the largest failures of the crisis. These institutions include AIG, Countrywide,
Indymac, Lehman Brothers, and Washington Mutual. That AIG, an insurance com-
pany, and Lehman Brothers, one of the largest investment banks, could recharter as
thrift institutions, which were originally designed to be narrowly specialized institu-
tions for providing mortgage credit to households, illustrates how far deregulation
had eroded distinctions between institutions (Taub, 2014; FCIC, 2011).
In a now infamous 2003 photo,6 the director of the OTS, James Gilleran, posed
with three bank lobbyists to advertise the loose regulatory approach of the OTS. In
front of Gilleran and the lobbyists sat a stack of papers wrapped in red tape, which
signified federal regulations. Behind them was a banner which read, Cutting Red
Tape. In this picture, Gilleran held a chainsaw to the stack of regulations to dra-
matically show the commitment of the OTS to protecting financial institutions from
regulatory oversight. John Reich held garden shears in this picture, and continued
this trend when he replaced Gilleran as director of OTS. The OTS was abolished
for this negligence following the financial crisis from 2007-2009 (Taub, 2014; FCIC,
2011).
Due to the role of unstable mortgages in contributing to the financial crisis, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was created as part of the Dodd-
Frank reforms. The CFPB has authority to regulate any person that engages in
6This picture was published in the FDIC Annual Report of 2003. Accessed 5-5-2016 from: https:
//www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2003annualreport/ar03full.pdf
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offering or providing a consumer financial product or service. The authority to regu-
late several different types of institutions helps to prevent the competition in laxity
described above. The CFPB also has the authority to use rulemakings to prohibit
unfair, deceptive, or abusive financial products. For regulating mortgages, the most
significant CFPB reform is the ability-to-repay rule. This rule requires that lenders
make a good faith effort to ensure that borrowers can repay the loan, such as doc-
umenting income, employment, other debt or expenses, and credit history. Failure
to do so provides the borrower a legal defense against foreclosure. The CFPB has
also establish a class of qualified mortgages which are considered to have met the
requirements of the ability to repay rule. Qualified mortgages are prohibited from
containing features such as negative amortization, balloon payments, excess upfront
points and fees, and limit how much of your income can go towards debt (Levitin,
2012).7
However, the ability of the CFPB to protect consumers is also subject to im-
portant limitations. Most importantly, the CFPB's powers are limited to ensuring
consumer protection through restrictions from above. The CFPB can use rulemak-
ings to curtail consumer protection abuses, but cannot mandate that intermediaries
provide products which embody best practices. For example, the CFPB cannot man-
date that a lender provide plain vanilla products to which more complex products
can be compared to. Additionally, the CFPB cannot mandate that a lender provide
services to those who currently lack access to financial services (Levitin, 2012). An-
other limitation to restrictions imposed from above is that there are detection and
enforcement costs in identifying abuses and prohibiting them. For example, prior to
rulemaking the CFPB must identify the abusive practice, and thoroughly document
7For more description of the ability-to-pay rule and qualified mortgages, see: http://www.
consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1787/what-ability-repay-rule-why-it-important-me.html
and http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1789/what-qualified-mortgage.html. Ac-
cessed July 7th, 2016.
105
it. To enforce the restriction, the CFPB must file a civil suit, and engage in exten-
sive litigation. Therefore, there is potentially substantial lag time between when the
abusive practice occurs, when it is discovered, and when the prohibition is enforced.
The next section of this paper will describe how the creation of a public bank and
online financial services marketplace can complement the CFPBs current abilities by
addressing these shortcomings through competition from below.
3.3 A New Public Option
This section presents the proposal for the creation of a new public option for
household finance in the primary market. This section first describes the features
of the new public option, which include the creation of a public bank and online
financial services marketplace, as well as the regulatory tools each of these features
would provide. The section then discusses the similarities and differences between
this proposal and the proposals for postal banking by the USPS OIG. It concludes
by discussing likely banking industry criticisms of this proposal.
Overall, the new public option would have two related features. First, the public
option would include the creation of a new public bank which directly provides basic
financial services, including mortgages, to households. Second, it would include an
online financial services marketplace. These two features would use competition and
transparency to address the two regulatory weaknesses associated with deregulation
identified in section 2. These problems include private financial innovations that
redistribute risk to households, and regulatory arbitrage.
The first feature of the new public option would be the creation of a public bank
to serve the needs of households. This bank would be organized as a government
corporation, rather than a government agency, to increase administrative flexibility.
The primary difference between a government corporation and a government agency
is that the government corporation is not subject to the congressional appropriations
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process, because it is required to generate enough revenue to cover costs by providing
goods and services. Therefore it has much more flexibility in the design and execu-
tion of its budget (Kosar, 2011). The public bank would be a member of the Federal
Reserve system, and have deposits insured by the FDIC. The bank would be regu-
lated by the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, and CFPB. The bank would also work in
coordination with the FHFA to meet federal housing objectives.
The public bank would directly provide basic financial services to households. The
services provided would include deposit services, small dollar loans, and mortgages.
The basic deposit services would include checking and savings accounts, check cashing,
direct deposit, and online banking. The checking account would also include a public
debit card. This card would allow online bill payments, mobile payments, e-commerce
payments, and any other activity traditionally associated with debit cards. The
public debit card would also allow access to a nationwide network of surcharge-free
ATMs, which would be located in post offices. Additionally, the public bank would
offer payment products like electronic money orders and international remittances.
These basic deposit and payment services are similar to those proposed by the USPS
OIG (USPS, 2015, 2014). The USPS proposal would implement all of these services
through a reloadable, prepaid debit card, provided by a partnering with a private
financial institution. In contrast with the USPS proposal, the public bank would
simply offer a traditional debit card linked to a deposit account, and not need to
partner with a private institution to provide this service.
From the perspective of promoting financial inclusion, it would be best if these
basic deposit services were provided free of charge. Revenue to cover operational
costs for these services could be derived from lending income or the provision of other
payment services such as money orders. Revenue for this could also be generated
by charging sellers a fee for participating in the online public financial services mar-
ketplace, described below. However, if these revenue sources were not sufficient to
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cover operational costs for deposit services, then a modest fee could be also assessed.
Providing free checking accounts and charging a fee for these services are both com-
mon in private financial institutions. Currently, 39 percent of checking accounts in
commercial banks are free, and 76 percent of checking accounts in credit unions are
free.8
The government should also provide small dollar loans which would replace unaf-
fordable non-traditional lending, such as payday lending. The loan terms would be
similar to those proposed by the USPS. The USPS proposal would make small dol-
lar loans available to any borrower that deposited two consecutive paychecks. Users
could borrow up to 50 percent of their gross paycheck, and make required monthly
payments of 5 percent of their gross paycheck. The USPS provides the hypothetical
example of a borrower making $18,000 per year, and paid in bi-weekly paychecks.
This person would be able to borrow up to $375. If the loan contained a 25 percent
interest rate and $25 origination fee, the loan could be paid off in 5.5 months with
interest and fees totalling $48. This presents substantial savings relative to the typical
payday loan, where interest and fees would total $520, implying an interest rate of
nearly 400 percent (USPS, 2014).
Alternatively, the loan terms could follow the template used in the FDIC Small
Loan Pilot Program. This program issued loans for $2,500 or less, with repayment
terms 90 days or greater, and a 36 percent interest rate. This program found that
longer loan terms reduced default rates, so longer terms should be encouraged (FDIC,
2010). Additionally, I propose that once a borrower successfully repaid a small dollar
loan, they be allowed access to a small dollar revolving line of credit. This would
provide users a more flexible safety net for unexpected expenses than having to apply
8Data on free checking accounts come from: http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/
want-free-checking-check-out-credit-unions-1.aspx. Accessed June 30th, 2016.
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for each loan separately. This would also reduce underwriting costs by removing the
need to underwrite every small loan to the same individual separately.
In addition, I propose that the public bank provide the full range of government
guaranteed mortgages, such as those insured by the FHA or guaranteed by the GSE's.
The public bank would focus on issuing affordable, plain vanilla mortgages with
transparent terms and fees. Mortgages to low-income borrowers would be insured
through the FHA, and follow the underwriting templates they have already developed.
Mortgages to middle or high income borrowers would need to conform to current
GSE underwriting guidelines. The bulk of mortgages issued through the public bank
would be securitized in the secondary market. Once these services have been proven
successful, it would also be straightforward to expand services to provide any other
type of government guaranteed loan, such as small business loans guaranteed by the
SBA. Expansion into other government guaranteed loans would be straightforward
because the public bank could take advantage of already developed underwriting
templates, and not be subject to credit risk due to the guarantees.
A related question is whether the bank should offer a full range of consumer
loans, such as credit cards and auto-loans. For the purposes of this proposal, I
would recommend that the public bank not offer these services. Instead, the public
bank should make them available through private providers in the online marketplace
described below. In principle, I think the government could likely provide these
services successfully. However, from a practical perspective, it would make more sense
for the public bank to initially focus on providing a more limited range of services.
This would avoid the need to create new underwriting standards, and reduce the
public bank's exposure to risk.
Directly providing services to households would provide several tools to accomplish
the regulatory goal of improving consumer protection, and address weaknesses in the
regulatory structure associated with deregulation. First, directly providing services
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to households would indirectly regulate the entire market by enforcing a quality floor
through competition, rather than through restrictions from above. High-cost finan-
cial services, such as payday or title lending, would simply not be competitive with
the low-cost, small dollar loans provided by the public bank. This quality floor would
also address the two regulatory weaknesses associated with deregulation described in
section 2. First, the quality floor would prevent financial innovations in mortgages
from redistributing risk away from intermediaries and towards households, i.e. the
type of innovation that flourished after deregulation. Mortgage innovations that were
riskier for households would not be competitive with public mortgages which were
less risky. Second, the ability to regulate through competition from below would also
prevent the regulatory arbitrage that occurred following deregulation. As intermedi-
aries adopted similar business models following the removal of restrictions on their
activities, they could change their charter to whatever regulatory institution would
offer the least restrictions. The quality floor prevents this because it would apply to
all institutions, regardless of the type of charter, or even if they lacked a charter.
This quality floor would also be similar to the proposal that the CFPB man-
date that private lenders offer plain vanilla products. These plain vanilla products
would serve as a reference point which more complex products could be compared to.
This would ensure that the additional mortgage terms added value for consumers,
rather than shifted risk towards them. The rejection of the plain vanilla proposal
also highlights a key weakness of the CFPB. The CFPB is limited to prohibiting
worse practices through restrictions, and mandate best practices (Levitin, 2012). In
contrast, the public bank could directly offer products embodying best practices for
reducing risk for households. In doing so, they would incentivize private institutions
to also offer these products through competition, rather than mandating they do from
above.
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Second, directly providing services would improve consumer protection by directly
providing access to financial services for those who currently lack them. As described
in the previous section, between 30 percent of U.S. households either lacks access to a
deposit account, or has a deposit account but is still forced to rely on non-traditional
high-cost services such as payday lending. Providing those who lack access with ser-
vices also provides a way to build credit history for the underserved, thus allowing
them to eventually be included in the traditional market (Baradaran, 2015; USPS,
2015, 2014). Moreover, as described in section 2, those who lack access to traditional
financial services are vulnerable to financial innovations that redistribute risk towards
them, because they have no other alternatives. However, these innovations generated
substantial macroeconomic externalities because they concentrated risk on those least
able to bear it, thus contributing to the financial crisis. Directly providing the under-
served with services would prevent this problem by giving those who currently lack
services low-risk alternatives.
Finally, similar to the experience of the HOLC described in section 1, directly
providing services to households would give the government the ability to regulate
through setting trends with financial innovations. The government could experiment
with creating new forms of financing for households, and standardize best practices to
allow them to be adopted on a widespread basis by private institutions. This would
provide an alternative to the regulatory weakness associated with private innovation
following deregulation, which often redistributed risk away from intermediaries.
For example, one possible area for innovation would be to experiment with more
equity-like financing structures for mortgages that shield borrowers from the market
risk associated with house price declines, such as shared responsibility mortgages
(SRMs). The financing structure of SRMs is different from traditional debt-based
mortgage structures because the lender offers downside protection to the borrower in
cases of house price declines. If the value of the home decreases to below the purchase
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price of the home, their monthly payments would be proportionally reduced, while the
amortization schedule remained the same. As the house price recovered, the monthly
payment would be proportionately increased until it reached the original level. In
return for this protection, the borrower would offer the lender a small percentage
of any capital gains on the home due to house price appreciation.9 In contrast, the
distributional terms inherent to debt-financing specify that the borrower take first
losses from house price declines, until their equity is wiped out (Mian and Sufi, 2014).
The distributional terms inherent in debt-financing cause negative externalities
from a macroeconomic standpoint because this financing structure can cause large
declines in spending following house price declines, as was seen during the financial
crisis of 2007-2009. Mian and Sufi have argued that widespread use of these mortgages
would have significantly reduced the severity of the Great Recession (Mian and Sufi,
2014). Some form of financial structure such as SRMs that results in a more equitable
distribution of losses between debtor and creditor could potentially offer a superior
alternative to the current structure of mortgages. However, it will likely take some
experimentation and standardization before this structure could be adopted on a
widespread basis. Directly providing services would give the government the ability
to accomplish this.
An obvious concern with the creation of a public bank is that it will expose taxpay-
ers to loss. Providing basic payment services is a relatively low risk enterprise, because
it does not involve lending. However, providing loans of any type does necessarily
expose taxpayers to some risk. This risk can be minimized through securitization,
ensuring risk-pricing of loans rather than politicized underwriting, high capital re-
9
? provide rough calculations suggesting that 5 percent of any capital gains would be sufficient to
cover the costs of the downside protection. However, in practice the particular percentage charged
will likely vary depending on a number of factors.
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quirements, and explicitly pricing the government's guarantee of the public bank's
debt. I consider these factors in detail below.
First and most basic, most of the mortgages originated by the public bank will
be securitized in secondary markets. Securitization provides two forms of protection
against loss. First, securitization directly removes credit and interest rate risk from
the public bank's balance sheet. Second, securitization provides a revenue stream
from servicing mortgages that can be used to offset losses. Additionally, mortgages
that were held in portfolio would be high quality because they would either be insured
through the FHA/VA, or conform to GSE underwriting standards. These underwrit-
ing standards have benefitted from the experience of several decades of development,
and will help to shield the public bank from loss.
Second, the public bank will have to ensure that underwriting is not politicized.
One could imagine the possibility of substantial political pressure to lower underwrit-
ing standards in an attempt to make loans more widely available, leading to under-
pricing of risk. A bulwark against politicized underwriting is that this institution will
be organized as a public corporation which is required to raise enough revenue to cover
costs. The public bank would bear first losses due to inadequate underwriting, and so
would be interested in resisting any pressures to loosen underwriting standards. Ad-
ditionally, the public bank will be regulated by the FDIC, OCC, and Federal Reserve.
These regulators have substantial experience in best risk management practices, and
will provide external controls against inadequate underwriting.
The danger of politicized underwriting is likely most acute for small dollar loans,
because risk-pricing may conflict with the goal of financial inclusion. To the extent
that these loans are made to higher risk borrowers, such as those that do not have ac-
cess to traditional financial services, they will require higher interest rates. This is one
reason why interest rates are high at non-traditional lenders such as payday lenders.
However, there is also good reason to believe that the government could provide small
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dollar loans at lower cost than non-traditional lenders, while still adequately pricing
risk. The government has a lower cost structure due to 1) economies of scale, 2)
lower overhead costs, and 3) non-profit structure. Were the public bank to partner
with the USPS to provide these services through the post office branch network as
proposed below, the government would be able to benefit from large economies of
scale and lower overhead costs. These economies of scale would allow the creation of
standardized underwriting templates which would reduce underwriting costs. Utiliz-
ing already existing post offices, as well as a robust online platform, would also lower
overhead costs. Finally, not needing to generate profits would also lower the cost of
these loans. These cost-advantages should allow the public bank to meet the goal
of financial inclusion by offering these services at lower cost than currently available,
while still adequately pricing risk.
Alternatively, if these cost advantages are not adequate to provide these small
dollar loans at a low enough cost to make them sufficiently available to the financially
underserved, then the public could consider directly subsidizing them through Con-
gressional appropriations. This could be economically justified based on preventing
the negative macroeconomic externalities described above. Additionally, this could
also be justified based on the positive externalities of these services. The provision
of small dollar loans can be interpreted as a social insurance program that provides
a safety net. To be sure, the primary beneficiary of the small dollar loan is the per-
son who needs it because of some unexpected shock. However, we all benefit when
our neighbors have a safety net. Those who are desperate for money often resort
to unethical behavior to obtain the money, resulting in larger social costs. To the
extent that the community benefits when its weakest members have a safety net, but
this benefit is not priced, we would expect markets to under produce this service.
Therefore, there is an economic argument for directly subsidizing this service.
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A third mechanism to protect taxpayers from loss is to reduce allowable leverage
through a high capital requirement for the public bank. To be sure, the final capi-
tal requirements would need to be determined based on the expertise of the Federal
Reserve, OCC, and FDIC. However, the experience of the 2007-2009 financial crisis
can provide a benchmark for capital requirements sufficient to withstand even catas-
trophic losses. For example, combined mortgage losses for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and private mortgage insurers during the 2007-2009 financial crisis were roughly 4-5
percent of the loan balance (Zandi, 2013). Therefore, a capital requirement of 7-10
percent would provide a very conservative level of capitalization able to withstand
even catastrophic losses similar to the crisis of 2007-2009. For small dollar unsecured
loans, the FDIC Small Dollar Loan Pilot Program, which occurred from 2007-2009
during the financial crisis, can provide a benchmark estimate. The program provided
small dollar loans under $1,000, and near small dollar loans of between $1,000-$2,500.
The charge off rate for small dollar loans peaked at 6.2 percent in the fourth quarter
of 2009, while the charge off rate for near small dollar loans peaked at 9 percent
(FDIC, 2010). Therefore, a higher capital requirement of between 10-12 percent
would be a strong cushion against losses in small dollar loans even during periods of
high economic stress.
The last mechanism protecting taxpayers against loss would be to explicitly price
the implicit guarantee of the public's banks debt. As a public corporation, the public
bank's debt would be backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.
However, if this guarantee was not explicitly priced, the government would not have
any reserves against loss. This guarantee could be priced by having the public bank
pay a small assessment for any non-deposit debt issued. This assessment could then
be placed into an insurance fund managed by the FDIC. The FDIC would be an
appropriate institution to manage this insurance fund because this guarantee is func-
tionally similar to deposit insurance. Explicitly pricing this guarantee would also help
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to ensure that this institution did not enjoy a competitive advantage compared with
private banks, due to lower borrowing costs. Overall, for the loans held in portfolio
the combination of prudent underwriting, high capital requirements, and explicitly
priced government guarantee should provide redundant levels of taxpayer protection
sufficient to withstand even catastrophic financial crisis.
A final question concerning the public bank is how large we would expect this
bank to be. To be sure, there is likely too much uncertainty to credibly to estimate
the precise market share this institution would be expected to account for. This
would depend on a number of factors such as the outcome of market competition, the
state of the economy, and how the financial system evolves through time. However,
it is plausible to anticipate that the public bank will likely be roughly as large as a
medium-sized financial services provider. Due to the limited nature of the services
offered through the bank, we would not expect it to be as big as the largest firms,
which all offer a substantially larger range of services. Indeed, the top 5 banks - J.P.
Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and U.S. Bancorp - control
almost half the assets of the banking industry.10 That being said, were the public
bank to partner with USPS to deliver services through the postal branch network,
as described in more detail below, the public bank would be able to increase the
total number of bank branches by one-third. Therefore, it would have a substantially
larger geographic presence than any other financial services institution. This large
geographic network would likely allow the public bank to grow in size comparable to
a medium-sized institution, despite the limited range of services offered.
10See Schaefer, Steve, December 3, 2014, Five Biggest U.S. Banks Control Nearly Half Industry's
$15 Trillion in Assets, Forbes. Accessed July 4th, 2016 from: http://www.forbes.com/sites/
steveschaefer/2014/12/03/five-biggest-banks-trillion-jpmorgan-citi-bankamerica/
#427f3a711d43 .
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3.3.1 A Public Online Financial Services Marketplace
The second service that the new public option would provide would be to man-
age an online financial services marketplace. This marketplace would allow private
intermediaries to offer a wide range of financial services to households, provided that
these services met high consumer protection standards. Services from the public bank
would also be offered through this marketplace, and directly compete with private
services. This marketplace would also include a consumer protection ratings system
and consumer reviews. The consumer protection ratings system would be developed
in coordination with the CFPB. Both individual products as well as service providers
could be rated. If a service provider's rating fell below a threshold, they could lose
access to the online market place. This online financial services marketplace would
be similar to the health insurance market places created by the Affordable Care Act,
which also includes a ratings system for health insurance plans.
Providing consumer protection ratings in an online marketplace would help to pre-
vent consumer protection abuses through increasing transparency and standardizing
comparison of terms. Standardized ratings systems have been successfully used in
numerous contexts to eliminate consumer protection abuses based on informational
asymmetries or outright fraud. For example, grain is often used in economics text-
books as the canonical example of a uniform product. However, in actuality grain
quality is highly heterogeneous across numerous dimensions such as type of grain,
weight per bushel, presence of other seeds, amount of foreign material such as glass
or stones, the amount of animal filth, and many other measures. The development
of a rating system by the U.S. Department of Agriculture allowed wheat to be easily
traded because the buyer knows exactly what they are getting (Akerlof and Shiller,
2015). Standardization would also allow for easier securitization and widespread
adoption of best practices.
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This ratings system could also be modeled off of that developed by the Affordable
Care Act for rating consumer protection in health insurance plans. Financial and
health services share many similar informational asymmetries that provide fertile soil
for deceptive practices. For example, when a patient walks into a doctor's office,
they do not always know exactly what health problem they are suffering from, or the
necessary treatments to cure them. They rely on the doctor's professional knowledge,
and trust the doctor to not prescribe unnecessary treatments of little medical value
that would enrich the doctor (Arrow, 1963). Similarly, when a borrower applies for
a loan, the loan underwriter typically has better knowledge of what they can afford
than the borrower does. The borrower relies on the loan underwriter's professional
knowledge to provide them with an affordable loan that is in their financial best
interest (Campbell et al., 2011).
Financial contracts and health insurance contracts are also similar in that their
complexity provides many areas to hide fees or other contract terms. Developing a
standardized template for rating consumer protection could prevent consumer protec-
tion abuses by increasing transparency of services, shine light on hidden contractual
clauses, and create a standard pricing system to eliminate hidden fees. Hidden fees
and transactions costs are especially onerous for first time homebuyers. Total trans-
actions costs can often total over half the down payment for first time home buyers
(Akerlof and Shiller, 2015).
The consumer protection ratings system would also help to address the two regu-
latory weaknesses associated with deregulation that were discussed in section 2. First,
it would help to prevent financial innovations that redistributed risk away from fi-
nancial intermediaries and towards households. New private innovations would need
to be rated before they could be listed on the public marketplace. Innovations that
redistributed risk towards households would receive low ratings. If these innovations
redistributed too much risk, their ratings would sufficiently low that they could not
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be listed. For example, if a private bank wanted to list a new mortgage structure, the
public bank in coordination with the CFPB would evaluate the mortgage based on
how the mortgage terms distributed interest rate, market, and liquidity risks between
borrower and lender. Various fees such as delinquency fees and prepayment penalties
could also be included in the rating. Additionally, if the new mortgage structure had
some prior usage in the private market, average default rates could also be included.
Each of these features would receive a score based on how they predicted default, or
some other negative outcome. A weighted average of these scores would then be com-
bined into a total score. If this score predicted a level of defaults above an acceptable
threshold, for example one standard error above the mean default rate for a 30 year
fixed-rate mortgage, then this new mortgage would not be listed.
Second, these ratings would apply to all institutions, regardless of type of char-
ter or lack of charter. This would prevent the regulatory arbitrage which occurred
following deregulation. Institutions would not be able to avoid this rating system
by switching charters to a less stringent regulatory authority. Moreover, unregulated
entities such as shadow banks would not be able to avoid this ratings system and still
be listed in the public marketplace.
Consumer reviews of products and sellers would also help to supplement the reg-
ulatory effectiveness of the consumer protection ratings system. Consumer reviews
would give consumers a voice in addressing consumer protection issues as they emerge,
and serve as an early warning system. If enough negative reviews accumulated for
a product or seller, then their consumer protection rating would be reviewed by the
public bank and CFPB. If this review found that these negative reviews were war-
ranted, then the product or sellers rating would be downgraded. If the downgrade
was sufficiently large, this product or seller could be excluded from the online mar-
ketplace. Limiting access to the online marketplace to products and sellers that had
high consumer protection ratings would directly regulate products and sellers partic-
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ipating in the marketplace, but would also indirectly regulate products and seller in
the broader private marketplace through competition. Lenders outside of the public
marketplace would need to compare the services to those offered in the public mar-
ketplace to show borrowers that they contained similar protections and were a better
deal.
Finally, managing an online marketplace would also improve private regulation of
the marketplace. For example, one of the primary forms of fraud which contributed
to the housing bubble was appraisal value inflation (Griffin and Maturana, 2016).
Loan officers told appraisers what price the house needed to be appraised at in order
to make the loan go through. This contributed to the inflation of the bubble through
increasing house prices. Appraisers are formally supposed to be independent from
loan officers. However, loan officers were able to gain leverage over appraisers by
threatening to blacklist them if they did not provide the desired appraisal values. A
2007 survey of 1,200 appraisers conducted by the October Research Corporation found
that 90 percent of appraisers reported that mortgage brokers and others pressured
them to inflate appraisal values in order to approve more loans, and that 75 percent of
appraisers reported the possibility of being blacklisted for not providing the inflated
values requested (Murray, 2009).
3.3.2 Relation to Existing Postal Banking Proposals
The proposal for a new public option in this paper builds off of the proposals for
postal banking from the USPS OIG (USPS, 2015, 2014). However, there are also
important differences. The primary difference is that I propose that the public bank
be constituted as an independent agency whose main mission is improving regulation,
rather than as a subsidiary agency whose primary goal is revenue generation for the
USPS. This is to prevent any conflict that may arise between revenue generation and
the regulatory mission of the institution.
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The tension between generating revenue for the USPS, and the public mission of
providing low-cost financial services to those that lack them, is the primary drawback
I see in the USPS proposal. The USPS proposals argue that they would be able
to provide financial services at lower cost than private industry because of lower
overhead costs and economies of scale. It is likely that these cost-advantages would
allow the USPS, or the public bank, to sustainably provide these services at a lower
price than is currently available in the private sector. However, to the extent that the
provision of these services would need to also generate revenue to fund mail delivery,
these services would require a higher price. In the end, it may not be feasible for the
financial difficulties of the postal system to be paid for by the poor (Levitin, 2014).
While I propose the new public bank be constituted as an independent organi-
zation, it would still be useful for this institution to partner with the USPS to take
advantage of the postal service's large geographic branch network. The primary ben-
efit I see in the postal banking proposals is that the wide scope of the geographic
branch network - a post office in every ZIP code - would make the USPS particularly
well-suited for providing financial services to those who currently lack it. The post
office currently has more than 35,000 post offices which could serve as local financial
services providers. In comparison there are roughly 95,000 bank branches. There-
fore, a partnership between the public bank and the USPS would single-handedly
increase the total number of branch locations serving communities by over one-third.
Additionally, 59 percent of post office branches are located in ZIP codes with either
a single or no bank branches. Moreover, these post office branches are unified into
a single national network which is significantly larger than any private network. For
example, the largest single bank branch network belongs to Wells Fargo, and includes
roughly 6,300 bank branches (Baradaran, 2015; USPS, 2014).11
11Commercial bank branch data from Hess, Alexander, Bank with the Most
Branches, USA Today, October 5th, 2014. Accessed April 13th, 2016 from:
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In partnering with the USPS, this new public option could still generate some
revenue for the USPS. Revenue could be generated through renting space from postal
branches or through the sale of financial products provided by the public bank. For
example, the postal service could gain revenue through helping borrowers apply for
loans that would then be underwritten by the public bank. This arrangement would
also be easier to implement for the post office than directly providing these services
itself.
3.3.3 Would the Public Bank Create Unfair Competition?
The financial services industry will almost certainly oppose this proposal on the
grounds that a public bank would create unfairly subsidized competition. To be
sure, the goal of this proposal is to regulate the market through fair public-private
competition, rather than unfairly subsidized competition. To this end, there are
mechanisms in this proposal to ensure that competition between the public bank and
traditional banks is on a level playing field. First, the public bank would be required
to generate enough revenue to cover costs, and would not be explicitly externally
subsidized. Second, I proposed above that the guarantee of the public banks debt be
explicitly priced to insure taxpayers against loss. This would also help to ensure fair
competition by reducing the ability of the public bank to borrow funds at lower cost
than private banks due to government guarantee of its debt. Third, I also proposed
that the public bank have high capital requirements to protect taxpayers against
loss. However, these capital requirements are higher than those for private banks,
which would put the public bank at a competitive disadvantage. Finally, the limited
product range of the public bank also reduces the scope of competition. For example,
commercial banks are typically not interested in offering borrowers small dollar loans
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/10/05/24-7-wall-st-banks-with-most-
branches/16648133/ .
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because they are less profitable than larger loans. Therefore offering these products
would not be in direct competition with commercial banks.
Additionally, the public bank would also provide private banks with a range of
benefits. For example, the public banking system could serve as a mechanism for
bringing new users into the private banking system. The public bank would increase
access to those who currently lack it, and potentially help them build credit history.
Due to the limited nature of the services the public bank would offer, these new users
would then migrate into the traditional private financial services system when they
needed a wider range of services. Another potential benefit is that if the public bank
allowed members to deposit and withdraw funds at postal branches, it would be easy
to extend this capability to private institutions as well. Private banks would then
have access to a branch network that is 5-6 times larger than any single private bank
network, and located in every ZIP code in the country. Additionally, private banks
would be able to access the online financial services marketplace, potentially gaining
new business. Allowing access to the postal branch network and online marketplace
would also help to level the playing field between smaller community banks and larger
commercial banks.
Finally, it is likely that the public bank will gain market share, at the expense of
private banks, through fair competition. This competition would represent a limita-
tion on the private banks' current domain. However, this limitation would fulfill the
important public purpose of regulating market failures in the private sector, and pro-
viding goods and services that private institutions are not adequately providing. As
described in the second section of this paper, serious consumer protection abuses by
private financial services providers concentrated risk on those least able to bear it, and
contributed to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The terms which
distribute risk in mortgages are therefore legitimate objects of public regulation due to
the large macroeconomic externalities they can potentially generate. Moreover, these
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consumer protection abuses rapidly reemerge absent a regulatory framework suffi-
cient to suppress them. Public-private competition would provide regulatory tools to
prevent these abuses which are likely more durable than those currently available.
Moreover, public-private competition will only be onerous for financial institu-
tions to the extent that their business model relies on consumer protection abuses for
profits. For example, this competition will likely by strongly felt by non-traditional
lenders, like payday lenders. Competition will make these institutions need to change
their business model to one that does not rely on charging the poor 400 percent inter-
est rates, or risk being displaced by low-cost public alternatives. However, through
directly providing services the public bank would also be creating a sustainable busi-
ness model for small dollar loans which could be adopted. Therefore public banking
would also provide these institutions a pathway for change, in addition to compelling
them to change through competition.
An irony of this proposal is that in many ways, the image of the public bank would
be to fulfill the role of the limited public utility which the New Deal envisioned for
private intermediaries, as described in section 1. Rather than imposing restrictions
on private intermediaries to fulfill this role, under this proposal the government will
directly perform this function itself, and in doing so improve regulation of the private
market as well. This is appropriate because this type of limited public utility could
still provide important functions, however private intermediaries are not interested in
playing this limited role. Private intermediaries were always interested in significantly
broadening their business activites beyond that of a narrowly restricted public utility.
For example, former CEO of Wells Fargo Dick Kovacevich described the passage of
the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, which represented the final repeal of the New
Deal Glass-Steagall act, as, a change I personally worked on for two decades. So, by
the year 2000, after a quarter century of deregulation, financial services companies
could sell any financial product, in any part of the U.S., at competitive, market-
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driven prices, (Kovacevich, 2008). While public-private competition under the new
proposal may restrict the domain of private institutions in some areas, there would
still be a much wider domain of action for these institutions than was allowed prior
to deregulation.
3.4 Conclusion
The proposal in this paper to create a public bank and manage an online financial
services marketplace would allow the government to use competition and transparency
to prevent consumer protection abuses in financial services. These tools would com-
plement the CFPB's current capabilities, helping to ensure that consumers received
financial products consistent with their best interest. However, in closing it is also
important to acknowledge the limitations of the tools provided by this proposal. The
main limitation of this proposal for housing finance is that in restricting the discussion
to the creation of new primary market institutions, it does not focus on the current
discussion of reforms of secondary market institutions.
Since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the government has played a larger role in sup-
porting mortgage origination due to the withdrawal of private capital. Since 2008, the
GSE's have guaranteed 60 percent of new mortgage originations, while the FHA/VA
has guaranteed another 20 percent (Frame et al., 2015). This has led to a widespread
debate concerning possible institutional structures for the secondary market, as well
as the appropriate role for government in this market. As of 2013, there have been
at least 26 prominent proposals from academics, think tanks, industry, and policy
makers for reforming the secondary market, including 4 which were introduced as
bills in the House of Representatives.12 These proposals have spanned a wide range
12For example, in 2013 the Center for American Progress compiled a summary of 26 secondary
market reform plans. Retrieved July 10th, 2016 from: https://www.americanprogress.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/09/GriffithHousingTable-revised.pdf
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of institutional structures, including fully private, fully public, and hybrid public-
private structures. A full review of these plans are beyond the scope of this paper.
However, it is worth noting that regardless of the final structure agreed upon for the
secondary market, the regulatory tools provided by this proposal would be useful for
reducing credit risk in the mortgages to be securitized. The tools in this paper are
tailored for reducing consumer protection abuses. However, this would also reduce
credit risk to the extent consumer protection abuses increase the probability of de-
fault. Indeed, reducing credit risk in this paper would be more important for the more
lightly regulated fully private proposals. These tools would help to reduce the gross
misrepresentation of credit risk in private MBS which contributed to the 2007-2009
financial crisis, as described in section 2.
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